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Abstract
Engaging in the philosophical debate surrounding proper classes is a tough task. The
waters are both muddy and treacherous. In particular, there is no full and rigorous
analysis of the logical geography of the area; what one should accept if one makes
certain assumptions about ontology. The water would be substantially cleaned up (if
not made any less treacherous) by a thorough and comprehensive treatment of just
this.
This thesis can be seen as one part of a comprehensive study. The methodology
is to precisely state some ontological assumptions, and then to examine how one
should characterise proper classes given these assumptions. In Chapter 1 I outline
the paradoxes I will be considering and the assumptions I am making. I suggest
that a better philosophical understanding of ontology would allow us to motivate a
solution to the paradoxes. In Chapter 2 I consider (and reject) just such an ontological
thesis; the conception that proper classes are ontologically ‘heavyweight’. In Chapter
3 I examine some views that attempt to characterise proper classes using modal
resources. I then give reasons as to why I find these standpoints unsatisfactory.
Chapter 4 provides an analysis and defence of the stance that proper classes are
artefacts of plural reference.
The thesis of this work is that if one holds a certain kind of realism about math-
ematical ontology, then (under the Iterative Conception of set) proper classes do not





1.1 Classes and Paradox.
Firstly, what do I mean by class1? We shall see that the notion is more complex
than one might immediately expect. Here, however, is a pre-theoretically plausible
definition:
Definition. A is a class iff A is a collection of 0 or more2 objects such
that for any object x it is definite whether or not x is a member of A34.
The notion of ‘definite’ given above is one that will recur throughout this thesis.
It will therefore serve to be precise about what I mean by the term.
Definition. A proposition P is definite iff there is a fact of the matter
whether or not P .
So, if for any object x it is definite whether or not x is a member of a class Y ,
then there is a fact of the matter whether or not x is a member of Y .
1I use the term class rather than set as I shall reserve ‘set’ for those classes that form sets under
the Iterative Conception of set.
2I use the locution ‘0 or more’ to respect the fact that I consider the empty class to be a class.
3This definition is largely inspired by Cantor; see [Cantor, 1883].
4A note on terminology; I use the upper-case letters from the start of the English alphabet (‘A’,
‘B’, ‘C’ etc.) to represent classes, and the lower-case letters from the end of the English alphabet
(‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’ etc.) to denote objects (including sets). The difference between sets and classes will be
explained later. The use of the upper-case letters ‘X’, ‘Y ’, ‘Z’ etc. is reserved for second-order logic,
with the exception of ‘P ’ which denotes a proposition.
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Given the metamathematical use to which we can put reasoning about classes5,
we should have cause for concern if our class-theoretical thinking turned out to be
inconsistent. As is well known, ‘na¨ıve’ formulations of class theory have just this fatal
flaw.
1.2 The Paradoxes.
I will examine the following paradoxes:
• 1.2.1 Russell’s Paradox.
• 1.2.2 Cantor’s Paradox.
• 1.2.3 The Burali-Forti Paradox.
1.2.1 Russell’s Paradox.
Russell’s Paradox has received a great deal of attention6. This is partly due to its
historical significance, the paradox was what infamously brought down Frege’s original
system. However, it is also because the derivation of the contradiction is quite simple
and elegant.
It will serve first to introduce some notation:
Notation. By ‘{x : φ(x)}’ I mean the ‘class’ of all x such that φ(x).
The paradox stems from considering the predicate ‘x is not a member of itself’
(in modern notation ‘x /∈ x’). If such a predicate succeeds in defining a class of all
objects that are not members of themselves (call it ‘R’) we would have a class such
that (∀x)(x ∈ R↔ x /∈ x). Assuming that R is an object, we may substitute ‘R’ for
‘x’ in ‘(∀x)(x ∈ R↔ x /∈ x)’. Then we get;
5For excellent reviews of a fraction of its uses see [Giaquinto, 2002] and [Fraenkel et al., 1973].
6Including from Russell himself. The following quotation speaks volumes about the difficulties
he experienced while trying to solve his own paradox (among others); “I was trying hard to solve
the contradictions mentioned above. Every morning I would sit down before a blank sheet of paper.
Throughout the day, with a brief interval for lunch, I would stare at the blank sheet. Often when
evening came it was still empty.....It was clear to me that I could not get on without solving the
contradictions, and I was determined that no difficulty should turn me aside from the completion
of Principia Mathematica, but it seemed quite likely that the whole of the rest of my life might be
consumed in looking at that blank sheet of paper.” ([Russell, 1967], p151).
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R ∈ R↔ R /∈ R
which is clearly a contradiction.
It is possible to restate the paradox informally. Assuming that R exists, we may
ask whether or not it is a member of itself, i.e. is it the case that R ∈ R? If it is
a member of itself, then it is in the class of all non-self-membered objects (i.e. R),
and hence it is not a member of itself. If, on the other hand, it is not a member of
itself, it will be a member of the class of all non-self-membered objects i.e. itself, and
thus R will be self-membered. Hence R is a member of itself if and only if it is not a
member of itself.
1.2.2 Cantor’s Paradox.
Cantor’s paradox is, like Russell’s paradox, a very clear and straightforward piece of
reasoning. Central to the paradox is the notion of cardinality :
Definition. Two classes A and B have the same cardinality (number of
members) iff there is a bijection between them.
Definition. A bijection between class A and class B is a function with
the following three properties:
• i) Total-the function maps every member of A to a member of B.
• ii) Injective-the function maps no two members of A to the same
member of B.
• iii) Surjective-every member of B is in the range of the function.
Definition. Class A has a greater cardinality than class B iff:
• i) there is no bijection between A and B
• ii) there is a bijection between B and a proper subclass of A.
To generate this paradox, one must consider the class of all classes. If one examines
the cardinality of this class (the ‘Universal class’) and compares it to the cardinality
of the class of all subclasses of the Universal class, then one is lead to contradiction.
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Let the cardinality of the Universal class be denoted by ‘|U |’. Now consider the
power class (i.e. class of all subclasses) of U denoted by ‘P(U)’. Further, Cantor’s
Theorem states that for any class A that is a class of all subclasses of some class B, A
must have greater cardinality than B. Therefore |P(U)| is a greater cardinality than
|U |. However, P(U) is a class containing only subclasses of the class of all classes. As
every subclass is also a class, P(U) only has classes as members. Therefore, everything
in P(U) is also in U . Thus P(U) cannot be any more numerous than U . Now we
have a contradiction; |P(U)| both is and is not a greater cardinality that |U |.
1.2.3 The Burali-Forti Paradox.
The Burali-Forti paradox is another paradox that has had great historical significance.
Moreover, the concept used to generate the paradox (that of ordinal) is precise and
very mathematically important.
Before going through the paradoxical reasoning, it will be useful to introduce some
additional terminology:
Definition. A class A is said to be well-ordered by relation R iff
1. For any two elements a and b of class A, the following holds:
(a) Trichotomy-Exclusively either i) aR b, ii) bR a, or iii) b = a.
(b) Transitivity-If aR b and bR c, then aR c.
2. Any non-empty subclass of A has an R-least member.
Definition. An ordinal is the order-type of a class well-ordered under a
relation R.
Definition. A function f(x) is an isomorphism from class A under rela-
tion Q, to class B under relation R iff it is a bijection from A to B such
that for any a1, a2 ∈ A, a1Qa2 implies that f(a1)Rf(a2).
Definition. A section of a class A well-ordered by relation R is a class S
such that for some member x of A, S is the class of all R-predecessors of x
in A (i.e. S is a section of A iff for some x ∈ A, S = {y : y ∈ A ∧ y Rx}).
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Now, consider the class of all ordinals (denoted by ‘Ω’). It can be shown that Ω
is well-ordered by the following relation. For any order-types α and β, where α is the
order-type of a class X well-ordered by relation R1, and β is the order-type of class
Y well-ordered by relation R2, let R be a relation such that;
αRβ ↔df [there is an isomorphism from X under R1 to a proper initial
segment of Y under R2]
It is easy to prove that such a relation would well-order Ω (assuming such a class
exists). Thus Ω has its own order-type, to be denoted by ‘ord(Ω)’.
However, it is a theorem that every section of a well-ordered class is well-ordered.
Therefore, the section of ordinals less than ord(Ω) has a certain ordinal; let it be
the denotation of ‘ord(S)’. It is also a theorem that every ordinal α is the ordinal
of the section of all ordinals less than α. Therefore, ord(S) = ord(Ω), and hence
¬ord(S)Rord(Ω) (by the exclusivity of 1. (a) in the definition of well-ordering).
It is also a theorem that for any section C of a class A well ordered by R, it is
the case that ord(C)Rord(A). Therefore, ord(S)Rord(Ω). Thus we have a contra-
diction; it is both the case that ¬ord(S)Rord(Ω) and ord(S)Rord(Ω)7.
There are many variants and other kinds of class paradoxes, but the three just
outlined are fairly representative of what sort of reasoning is involved in generating a
class paradox and are those that feature most widely in the literature. I will, therefore,
restrict myself to only considering these three.
1.2.4 Attacking the Paradoxes.
In order to see what a solution must achieve, it will be instructive to understand why
the class paradoxes are so serious, and in what sense they are ‘paradoxes’.
The sense in which the class paradoxes are ‘paradoxes’ is simple enough; they
all proceed from (pre-theoretically) plausible assumptions, via seemingly legitimate
reasoning to patently false conclusions (contradictions). The reason they present such
a threat to our class-theoretic reasoning is that initial investigation reveals no clear
fallacy; there is no assumption or inferential step that is obviously faulty.
7The derivation of a contradiction on the assumption that there is a class of all ordinals can also
be produced using the von Neumann representation of ordinals used in modern Set Theory.
11
I will now consider what we can expect from a satisfactory solution, and the
methodological routes available for blocking the paradoxical reasoning.
1.2.4.1 What Constitutes a Satisfactory Solution?
It is not enough to merely ban the paradoxical reasoning from our class theory on
pain of paradox. Such reasoning would be, as Michael Dummett puts it, to merely
“wield the big stick” ([Dummett, 1994], p26). Pointing to the problem as evidence
for one’s solution is not to explain the problem.
In order to be satisfactory, a solution must do more. In order to truly understand
the paradoxes, we must be sensitive to the features of the mathematical structure
about which we are reasoning, and the sense in which we have failed to accurately
describe that structure. Therefore, I see four obvious constraints on a satisfactory
solution:
1. Precision-A solution must be precise in that it must identify in which respect
our thinking is faulty.
2. Motivation-Not only must a solution identify which part of our thinking is faulty,
it must also motivate this choice of error. Independent reasons must be given
regarding the piece of reasoning selected as defective. As such a solution cannot
merely be an ad hoc ban on the paradoxical reasoning.
3. Diagnosis-A solution should also diagnose why we have fallen into error in the
first place. In this way a solution should reveal a pathological element; it should
explain why the faulty reasoning initially seemed so appealing.
4. No Overkill -A solution must also avoid overkill ([Kirkham, 1995], p273)8. It
must be minimal in the sense that it should not prohibit accepted and valid
forms of reasoning.
With these constraints9 on possible solutions in place, what are the basic method-
ological options for locating the error in the paradoxes?
8While Kirkham is considering paradoxes of truth rather than class paradoxes, this nonetheless
seems like a reasonable constraint to put on a solution to any kind of paradox, including the class
paradoxes.
9I am by no means claiming that this list is exhaustive of good-making features of responses to
paradox. Nor do I claim that they are sufficient for a solution to be satisfactory. Indeed we shall
12
1.2.4.2 Locating the Error.
I see two main ways of solving any paradox:
1. Deny that the conclusion is actually untrue.
2. Attack a principle used in the derivation of the paradoxes.
(1.) is a route that some have taken (e.g. [Priest, 2002]). It is, however, a very tough
bullet to bite. There is little that could be more puzzling or mysterious than the
hypothesis that a contradiction is true. Almost any other revisionary claim seems to
be more intelligible than the claim that there are true contradictions. In this way,
such solutions seem themselves to be paradoxical; the medicine is just as bad as the
disease.
(2.) seems a more plausible avenue of inquiry. It is noticeable that all the class
paradoxes listed require a principle that if a predicate is precise, there exists a class of
all objects that satisfy the predicate. Not only this, but these classes must be objects
about which one may ask questions of membership, and to which one may apply
operations (for example, when one takes all subclasses in Cantor’s Paradox). Let us
now make a distinction; let a set be a definite collection of objects that is itself an
object distinct from its elements. Let a class be a definite collection of objects that
may or may not be an object. It is clear that the derivation of the class paradoxes
require us to be able to reason with classes as objects (i.e. sets) and so ask whether
they are members et cetera. In the case of the Russell paradox, one requires a principle
that implies the existence of a set of all objects that satisfy the condition φ(x) such
that φ(x) ↔df x /∈ x. Similar considerations apply in the case of the Burali-Forti
paradox (φ(x)↔df x = Ord(A) for some A), and Cantor’s paradox (φ(x)↔df x is a
set).
Such a principle is known as the Comprehension Principle and can be formalised
as follows:
[COMP] (∃C)(∀x)(x ∈ C ↔ φ(x))
see that there are some solutions to the class paradoxes that fare quite well with respect to these
constraints, but are unsatisfactory for other reasons. This list of desiderata is useful, however, for
seeing what is good about various responses, and why. For this reason, I will apply them when giving
a critical analysis of each proposal I consider.
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This states that for any condition φ(x) there is a set C such that x ∈ C ↔ φ(x).
This principle is not explicit in the above presentation of the paradoxes, but is tacitly
assumed. At the very least this tacit assumption of [COMP] requires justification.
Reasons must be provided for holding that given any precise predicate there is a set
of all objects that satisfy it. If one were to deny this principle, one would not be able
to justifiably assume the existence of the Russell set, set of all ordinals, or universal
set in deriving the contradictions.
We might then seek to restore the consistency of our class theory by denying
[COMP]. However, we should keep in mind the above constraints; it would be easy to
block the paradoxical reasoning with no justification. Further, [COMP] responds to a
strong intuition about sets, specifically that we define sets by using conditions. Any
class theory that denies [COMP] will want to provide a way of preserving part of this
intuition. Indeed, one may modify [COMP] in several ways to restore consistency.
How do we choose between the options available? A methodological route one might
take in order to avoid falling foul of the above desiderata is to try and motivate a
solution from ontology. If we can understand the nature of sets, then it will be easier
to see which of the alternatives available we should endorse. This is the methodology
that I will adopt throughout the rest of this thesis.
A comprehensive study of how ontology affects the solutions available is desirable.
Unfortunately, space does not permit a full examination of every ontological stand-
point. I will, therefore, restrict myself to a critique based on two assumptions about
ontology.
1.3 Assumptions of the Thesis.
1.3.1 The Iterative Conception of Set.
The first assumption concerns what sets exist within the universe of Set Theory. The
modern conception of set is the Iterative Conception of set. In this structure we begin
from a base of atomic objects (urelemente), and proceed in a series of stages by taking
repeated applications of the ‘set of’ operation.
The conception is succinctly expressed by Shoenfield thus:
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“Sets are formed in stages. For each stage S there are certain stages which
are before S. At each stage S, each collection consisting of sets formed at
stages before S is formed into a set. There are no sets other than the sets
which are formed at the stages.” ([Shoenfield, 1977], p323)
We can see, therefore, that the Iterative Conception of set can be represented as
a hierarchy. Starting with a definite collection of non-sets as urelemente, the sets are
built up in stages by constructing all the sets one can from objects available at earlier
stages. Thus a set x is in a stage S if and only if each member of x is in a stage
before S. The stages are cumulative in that every stage contains all the objects from
previous stages in addition to the sets formed at that stage.
However, we may disagree on what urelemente there are. This is not a problem10
for the investigation of Set Theory; there are some sets that will be in the hierarchy
no matter what urelemente are taken. These sets are the pure sets:
Definition. A set is pure iff all its elements are pure.
Now, as the Iterative Conception begins with a definite collection of urelemente,
we stipulate that this collection must be a set. It is reasonable, if we have a set,
to apply [COMP] restricted to that set. Such a principle is Zermelo’s Principle of
Separation (or Aussonderung):
[SEP] (∀x)(∃y)(∀z)[z ∈ y ↔ (z ∈ x ∧ φ(x))]
Let φ be some condition. This axiom schema states that for any set x there is a set
y of just the elements within x that satisfy φ. We are then guaranteed the existence
of the empty set by taking the set of all non-self-identical urelemente. The empty set
is vacuously pure (as it has no members). Thus the pure sets are those sets which
are constructed from the empty set. Since the paradoxes can be constructed with
attention restricted to the pure sets, I will (for reasons of simplicity) be primarily
concerned with the pure sets. From this point on I will refer to the universe of pure
10Though there are interesting differences (both philosophical and technical) between theories that
admit urelemente and those that do not. Considerations of space prevent an account of such issues
here.
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sets as the Cumulative Hierarchy11. We can pictorially represent the Cumulative
Hierarchy in the following way:
Figure 1.1: An initial segment of the Cumulative Hierarchy.
Assuming that we accept that we may use the sequence of ordinals in our reason-
ing12, we can then index the stages as folows:
Figure 1.2: Indexing the stages.
11It should be noted that it is possible to define a non-well-founded (and hence non-identical to
the Cumulative Hierarchy) structure that is defined in an iterative manner. See [Forster, 2008] for
such an example. For the sake of simplicity, however, I will assume that the Cumulative Hierarchy is
the intended structure defined by the Iterative Conception, and will not consider ‘deviant’ iterative
structures.
12I shall use the lower-case Greek letters (‘α’, ‘β’, ‘γ’ etc.) to denote ordinals.
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Here we can see that for any stage Vα there is a further stage Vα+1 such that
Vα+1 = V α ∪ P(V α). Next, assume that there is a set of all natural numbers,
denoted by ‘ω’. It is clear that ω is well-ordered by the less-than relation on the
natural numbers. Thus ω has an ordinal. Therefore, there is a stage Vω such that:
Vω = ∪Vn,n∈N
Then once more we can proceed as follows:
Vω+1 = Vω ∪ P(Vω)
At stages indexed by a limit ordinal (an ordinal that is neither zero nor the suc-
cessor of any ordinal) take the union of all previous stages thus:
Vλ = ∪Vβ,β<λ
A fuller pictorial representation of the Cumulative Hierarchy is, therefore, the
following13:
Figure 1.3: The Cumulative Hierarchy
13Obviously, there will be many more sets formed at Vω+1 than I can write down. The represen-
tation is useful for seeing the rough structure of the Cumulative Hierarchy.
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The Iterative Conception is appealing both technically and philosophically. From
a technical perspective, any theory that describes the sets as given to us by the
Iterative Conception will not allow the paradoxical reasoning. For the conditions
used in deriving all the paradoxes I have considered share the following property:
Definition. A condition φ is extendible iff for any set x of φs in the
Cumulative Hierarchy, there is a y in the Cumulative Hierarchy such that
φ(y) and y is not in x.
One can see then that the paradoxical classes do not appear as sets at any point
in the Cumulative Hierarchy. For if we take any set of φs present at some Vα of
the Cumulative Hierarchy, then we can use the above extendibility property of the
condition φ involved to show that there is some φ not in that collection. Therefore, the
collection of all φs has not been formed at that stage. If we think that the Iterative
Conception describes all sets, then the derivation of the paradoxes is blocked.
Let us see how the contradictions are prevented with respect to each collection.
In the case of Cantor’s paradox, for any Vα the set of all sets that exist at Vα will not
include some sets from other Vβ>α. Thus the Universal class will never appear as a
set.
The Russell class also never appears as a set. One can see that any set on the
Iterative Conception will satisfy the predicate ‘x 6∈ x’. To see this, assume that there
is an x such that x ∈ x, first formed at Vα. However, for any y in the Cumulative
Hierarchy y ∈ x implies that y was formed at some Vβ<α. Given then that x ∈ x,
it must be the case that x was first formed at some Vβ<α. But this contradicts our
assumption that x was first formed at Vα. Thus the following is the case on the
Iterative Conception:
(∀x)x 6∈ x
As for any Vα there will always be non-self-membered sets at other Vβ>α, the
Russell class can never appear as a set.
The Burali-Forti paradox is slightly more complicated. What, after all, is an or-
dinal? It is normal in Set Theory to represent ordinals by sets (known as ordinal
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numbers). As long as it holds that for any well-ordered set x there is an ordinal num-
ber that is order-isomorphic to x, we can mimic our reasoning about ordinals with
our reasoning about the ordinal numbers. Clearly, there will be different well-ordered
sets that one might choose to do this job. I shall use the popular von Neumann rep-
resentation of ordinals and let ‘rep(α)’ abbreviate ‘the von Neumann representation
of α’14:
Definition rep(0) = ∅.
Definition. rep(α+ 1) = rep(α) ∪ {rep(α)}.
Definition. For any limit ordinal λ, rep(λ) = ∪β<λrep(β).
Definition. The well-ordering relation on the ordinals is represented by
∈ on the ordinal numbers.
From this point on, by ‘the ordinal number of α’ I mean ‘the von Neumann
representation of α’ (i.e. ‘rep(α)’). One can see that for any ordinal α, rep(α) will
occur at Vα+1. This can be shown by the process of transfinite induction. If we show
the following three things:
(i) The ordinal number of 0 appears first at V1.
(ii) If α is an ordinal and α + 1 its successor, then if the ordinal number
of α appears first at Vα+1 then the ordinal number of α + 1 appears at
Vα+2 (i.e. V(α+1)+1).
(iii) For any limit ordinal λ, if the ordinal numbers of all β < λ are first
formed at stage Vβ+1, then the ordinal number of λ appears first at Vλ+1.
Then as all ordinals are either 0, a successor, or the limit of a sequence of succes-
sors, then showing these three things is sufficient to show that for any ordinal α, its
ordinal number is formed at Vα+1.
(i) The fact that the ordinal number of 0 appears first at V1 is immediate.
14My choice of the von Neumann ordinal numbers reflects ease of use and the fact that it is the
canonical representation.
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(ii) Assume that the ordinal number of α is first formed at Vα+1. Then for
every member x of rep(α), x is is first formed at some Vβ<(α+1). Therefore,
every member x of rep(α) exists at Vα+1. Given that every member of
rep(α) exists at Vα+1, and that rep(α) is first formed at Vα+1, and further
that rep(α+ 1) =df rep(α) ∪ {rep(α)}, then rep(α+ 1) is first formed at
Vα+2.
(iii) Let λ be the ordinal number of any limit ordinal. Assume that for all
β < λ, rep(β) is first formed at Vβ+1, but that rep(λ) is not first formed
at Vλ+1. Then either:
a) rep(λ) is first formed after Vλ+1.
or b) rep(λ) is first formed before Vλ+1.
a) ex hypothesi the ordinal number of each β < λ is first formed at Vβ+1.
As λ is a limit ordinal, for all β < λ, β + 1 < λ. Since i) we have just
shown that for all β < λ, β + 1 < λ, ii) the ordinal numbers of all β < λ
are formed at Vβ+1, and we already know that iii) Vλ =df ∪ζ<λVζ , then
Vλ contains all rep(β), β < λ. But rep(λ) is defined as ∪β<λrep(β) and
so (if rep(λ) has not already been formed) rep(λ) will be formed at Vλ+1.
So rep(λ) must exist at some Vα≤(λ+1).
b) assume then that rep(λ) is formed at some Vβ<(λ+1). Clearly rep(λ)
cannot be formed at any Vζ<λ as then it would be the case that i)
ex hypothesi rep(ζ) is formed at Vζ+1, ii) ex hypothesi ζ < λ and so
rep(ζ) ∈ rep(λ), and iii) rep(ζ) is first formed after rep(λ) is first formed
and so rep(ζ) 6∈ rep(λ). Therefore; (∗) rep(λ) is formed at Vλ. However,
as λ is a limit ordinal and any stage indexed by a limit ordinal is defined
as Vλ =df ∪ζ<λVζ , no new sets are formed at Vλ (the ones that already
exist are merely collected into a single stage) contradicting (∗).
Thus, for any ordinal α, the ordinal number of α is formed at Vα+1.

Given this fact, it is clear that the class of all ordinal numbers never occurs as a set
in the Cumulative Hierarchy. This is because for any set x of ordinal numbers in some
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Vα, there will be ordinal numbers not in x first formed at all Vβ>α. Therefore, the
assumption that there is a set of all ordinals contravenes the Iterative Conception of
set; there is no faithful representation of the ordinals that would allow the collection
of all representatives to appear in the Cumulative Hierarchy.
Further, the Iterative Conception has philosophical merit. The collection forming
practice represented by the structure is a natural one. For example, often mathemat-
ical inquiry begins by considering a domain of objects (for simplicity let us consider
the natural numbers). We then might notice that certain natural numbers stand in
certain relations to one another. 16 is the square of 4 would be one such relation be-
tween two numbers. We then want to consider all objects that stand in this relation
to one another. We can represent such relations as sets of ordered pairs. Thus we
may examine the function f(x) = x2 as a single object, represented by a collection of
ordered pairs15. However, then we might want to look at collections of these functions
that share a common property, such as the class of all exponentiation functions on
the natural numbers. So we collect these collections of ordered pairs into different col-
lections. Now, we may want to consider functions on functions, such as the function
f(x) that given a representation of a function g(x) will output the representation of
the function gg(x). Again we may want to collect these together into functions that
share common properties, or define functions on these objects. Thus we see how given
a starting collection of objects, we examine collections of these objects, and then col-
lections of these collections and so on. Such a process of mathematical development
and collection forming is exactly to what the Iterative Conception responds.
Perhaps then, by respecting our collection forming practice in describing the uni-
verse of sets, we motivate the rejection of the status of the paradoxical collections as
sets. It seems that it would be desirable if the Iterative Conception was an accurate
characterisation of the universe of Set Theory. I will, therefore, make the following
ontological assumption:
Assumption. The Cumulative Hierarchy, as described by the Iterative
Conception of set, contains all the (pure) sets that exist.
15If one is unhappy with the notion of ordered pair as a primitive, it is normal in modern Set
Theory to use the Kuratowski representation of ordered pair. We may represent the ordered pair
< x, y > by the set {{x}, {x, y}}.
21
This tells us what sets exist. However, there is a second substantial ontologi-
cal question left unanswered; what is the nature of the existence of the Cumulative
Hierarchy and the sets it contains?
1.3.2 Monist Realism.
I will assume the following view that provides an answer to the previous question:
Assumption. (Monist Realism)-The Cumulative Hierarchy has the fol-
lowing properties:
1. The sets are objects.
2. The Cumulative Hierarchy is a ‘complete’ abstract structure; for ev-
ery ordinal α, Vα exists. No new Vα are being created.
3. For any object x, it is definite whether or not x occurs in the Cumu-
lative Hierarchy.
4. There is only one Cumulative Hierarchy of pure sets (although iso-
morphic copies of it may exist within universes of sets with different
urelemente).
5. There is just one interpretation of the Cumulative Hierarchy. Our
quantifiers are not ambiguous; it is possible to quantify over all sets.
What then is the sense in which the Cumulative Hierarchy of pure sets is a ‘com-
plete’ structure? Under Monist Realism every stage Vα of the Cumulative Hierarchy
exists as part of an abstract, unchanging, mathematical structure. The sets which
form the stages are in turn eternal mathematical objects. No sets ever ‘come into
being’. While the Cumulative Hierarchy is explained using the metaphor of forma-
tion, it is not undergoing constant construction, it is rather (to put it metaphorically)
‘finished’ (and always was). Moreover, there is no way in which the universe could be
extended by adding more (pure) sets.
This conception of the Cumulative Hierarchy has some nice features. It is con-
ceptually and intuitively simple. When we reason about sets, we are reasoning about
objects that are part of a structure based on our normal collection forming practice.
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This conceptual simplicity makes the semantics for our theories much easier. A
constructivist, for example, will have to explain why we believe our set theoretic
statements to be true, even if the domain of objects over which she is quantifying is
constantly changing. If the Cumulative Hierarchy was undergoing constant genesis
then reference to sets would be different on different occasions. One might think that
this might have semantic implications, for example the statement (∃x)|x| ≥ |ω| could
have different truth conditions depending on whether or not we have constructed Vω.
The statement will be false (on a normal understanding) before the construction of
Vω, and true after. Similar problems apply for someone who thinks that the range of
set-theoretic quantifiers is ambiguous. There is no such problem with Monist Realism.
The nominalist about sets also has a great deal of work to do in their semantics,
as they have no objects with which they can substantiate their set theoretic claims.
Monist Realism allows us to easily ground the truth of statements we make about
objects within the Cumulative Hierarchy.
Thus Monist Realism seems to be a desirable view about the ontology of Set
Theory. However, it seems that a puzzle remains for a Monist Realist who subscribes
to the Iterative Conception of set.
1.4 A Puzzle for the Two Assumptions.
Let us pause for a moment. We have seen that the Iterative Conception is a plausible
theory about the nature of the set-theoretic universe; one that seems to provide a basis
for rejecting the paradoxes. Monist Realism, it would seem, is a desirable view about
ontology. A natural question to ask at this point is the following; ‘How compatible are
the two assumptions about ontology?’. I suggest that there is an important problem
left unsolved by a combination of these standpoints.
Whence then the puzzle? The argument is a simple one. If the Cumulative
Hierarchy exists in the manner just described, then for any precise predicate it is
definite whether or not it is satisfied by any particular set. Therefore there seems to
be a definite collection of just the objects satisfying that predicate.
For example, take the following perfectly precise set-theoretical predicate; ‘x is an
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ordinal number’. The predicate is perfectly precise in the sense that for any object
presented, there is a fact of the matter whether or not it satisfies that predicate.
Further, it is definite what the Cumulative Hierarchy contains. Therefore, ‘the ordinal
numbers’ picks out a definite range of sets within the Cumulative Hierarchy. Thus
‘the ordinal numbers’ has definite membership and hence is a class. But the class
of all ordinal numbers does not appear at any Vα. Indeed, if the class of all ordinal
numbers did appear at some Vα, the Iterative Conception would be inconsistent. I
will call classes of this sort proper classes.
Definition. A class A is a proper class iff A is a class with definite
membership that does not appear as a set in the Cumulative Hierarchy.
The problem then presented is the following. There are classes that do not appear
in the Cumulative Hierarchy. We lack a philosophical explanation of the ontological
nature of these classes. The issue is pressing; under Monist Realism the cogency of
the Iterative Conception depends on a satisfactory account. So then, given the two




In this Chapter I analyse the view that proper classes are ontologically ‘heavyweight’
objects. On this conception, proper classes are collections that are also abstract
objects over and above their elements.
• In 2.1 I explain the view to be discussed and present some of its positive features.
I suggest that, as it stands, a substantial philosophical question is not answered;
‘Why are proper classes not sets?’.
• In 2.2 I examine what form a satisfactory explanation of why proper classes are
not sets should take. I suggest that an explanation should provide us with the
resources for blocking the paradoxes. I note one way to do this, by justifying
the principle that proper classes cannot be members of other class-like entities.
I then consider three explanations for why proper classes are not sets that could
be used to motivate the principle that proper classes are not members:
[NMH]-The Non-Member Hypothesis: Proper classes fail to form sets
because they ‘cannot be members’.
[LSH]-The Limitation of Size Hypothesis: Proper classes fail to form
sets because they are ‘too big’.
[OHH]-The Occurrence in the Hierarchy Hypothesis: Proper classes
fail to form sets because they do not occur at any stage of the Cumu-
lative Hierarchy.
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• I give a critical evaluation of these explanations. I present some good features
of each, but argue that [NMH] and [LSH] are unsatisfactory explanations. I
then argue that [OHH] is a satisfactory explanation, but cannot be appealed to
by the heavyweight theorist.
• In 2.3 I conclude that the Heavyweight Theorist has no satisfactory answer as
to why proper classes fail to form sets.
I shall show that the Heavyweight View, while initially appealing, is untenable for
a Monist Realist.
2.1 The Heavyweight View.
2.1.1 What is the Heavyweight View?
It was seen in the last Chapter that if we wish to hold Monist Realism true, we need
to give a characterisation of proper classes. A natural starting point is to note some
salient features of proper classes.
As argued earlier, the Monist Realist must assert that proper classes have definite
membership. Further, it would seem that we are able to reason meaningfully about
proper classes and also use talk of proper classes in our discourse about sets. Here
are two such examples:
(Example 1) The use of proper classes within Set Theory.
Much work into the theory of large cardinals makes use of proper classes. For
example, a measurable cardinal can be defined as the critical point of a non-trivial
elementary embedding from the universe into a transitive class M1. Here, both M
and V are proper classes, and any ordered pairs that could represent this mapping
would also be a proper class.
(Example 2) The meaningfulness of proper class talk.
1There are other equivalent definitions of a measurable cardinal available (see [Kanamori, 2003],
p26 onwards). However, often definitions which have apparent reference to proper classes are used,
and it is not obvious that this use is eliminable (see [Uzquiano, 2003] for an argument to this effect).
A theory that can account for this use in a simple way would, therefore, be preferable to one that
cannot.
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I can make assertions about proper classes that seem to be truth evaluable. For
example, I might say “The class of all sets is the same class as the class of all non-self-
membered sets”. It would seem that this statement is false just in case there is a self-
membered set, and true otherwise (hence it is true under the Iterative Conception).
Here I seem to have talked about a proper class and said something meaningful.
These examples might2 lead one to believe that we have another notion of col-
lection besides that of set. Maybe the sets are not the only collections that exist.
Maybe proper classes are another kind of object-like collection, about which we may
construct a mathematical theory. If one has such inclinations one might hold the
Heavyweight View:
[Heavyweight View] Proper classes are collections with definite member-
ship that are objects distinct from their elements, but that are not sets.
Often, proponents of the Heavyweight View will talk of the proper classes being
‘above’ the Cumulative Hierarchy. This should be regarded as loose talk; a heavy-
weight theorist is not necessarily committed to the view that proper classes reside in
a ‘domain’ or ‘stage’ beyond all the stages of the Cumulative Hierarchy.
Thus one admits into the ontology of set theory two different kinds of objects;
proper classes and sets. Theoretically this is cashed out in different ways; Go¨del,
for example, makes do with only variables for ‘class’, but has a sethood predicate
[Go¨del, 1940]. Bernays on the other hand has two different kinds of variable; set
variables and class variables [Bernays, 1958]. Such considerations are clearly irrelevant
to ontology; howsoever one chooses to describe the situation the relevant ontology is
the same.
However, different heavyweight theories postulate the existence of different classes.
As proper classes are different kinds of things from sets there is no obstacle to holding
[COMP] as a principle about classes (here, for the sake of convenience and clarity,
the class membership relation is given by ‘η’ in order to distinguish it from the set
membership relation represented by ‘∈’):
2I say ‘might’, because it is not established that the examples entail the Heavyweight View.
Indeed it is my opinion that they do not. Examples such are these, however, allow one to see the
initial motivation for the Heavyweight View.
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[COMPη] ∃A∀x(xηA↔ φ(x))
In the system V NBG (originally proposed by von Neumann3 and subsequently
refined by Bernays4 and Go¨del5) only predicative conditions are allowed in [COMPη].
An impredicative condition is one that has a quantifier whose range includes the class
being defined in the defining condition. An example of impredicative definition is that
of greatest lower bound (or infimum) of a set:
inf(S) =df (ιx)(∀y ∈ S)(x ≤ y) ∧ (∀z)[(∀y ∈ S)(z ≤ y)→ z ≤ x]
Here we see that inf(S) itself must fall within the range of the quantifier ‘(∀z)’.
The point can be put informally as follows. The above sentence states that the
greatest lower bound of a set S is a lower bound x of S such that for any lower bound
z of S z is less than or equal to x. In the previous sentence the phrase “for any lower
bound z of S” quantifies over all lower bounds of S of which x (the object being
defined) is one. Hence the definition is impredicative.
Other theories allow for impredicative conditions in [COMPη]. Morse-Kelley set
theory (MK) is just such a theory. Because V NBG restricts [COMPη] to predicative
conditions where MK does not, MK will posit the existence of more classes than
V NBG.
While this is indeed a substantial theoretical difference, it is not important for my
discussion. The fact that MK posits the existence of more proper classes than V NBG
does not change the fact that both theories posit the existence of proper classes. In
both theories the Russell class, Universal class, and class of all ordinal numbers exist.
This is also the case with other heavyweight theories (such as Ackermann’s system6).
These are the collections for which we are seeking an explanation.
We now have a precise statement of the Heavyweight View, and have identified
an extraneous ontological question that should not distract us from the key tenets of
the proposal:
3A noticeable theoretical difference between von Neumann’s original system and the developments
made by Bernays and Go¨del is the use of the notion of ‘function’ as primitive rather than those of
‘set’ and/or ‘class’. This fact has no ontological import; there is a total one-to-one correspondence
between functions and classes, and the distinction between classes which are sets and proper classes
is exactly matched by a distinction among functions.
4In a 1931 letter to Go¨del and later in his [Bernays, 1958].
5See [Go¨del, 1940].
6Ackermann Set Theory, however, has other interesting features that will be discussed later.
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1. Proper classes have definite membership.
2. Proper classes are objects distinct from their elements.
3. Proper classes are a different kind of object from sets.
I will now examine some positive features of the Heavyweight View. Despite these
good aspects of the view I will suggest that the heavyweight theorist must give an
explanation of why proper classes are not sets.
2.1.2 Positive Remarks about the Heavyweight View.
Though I plan to argue against the Heavyweight View, it could be argued that it
fares quite well with respect to the criteria outlined in Chapter 1.
It is possible for the heavyweight theorist to provide a diagnosis. To begin with,
we think that we only have one notion of ‘collection’. It turns out that we have at
least two, one of ‘set’ and one of ‘proper class’. Proper classes are similar to sets;
they depend for their identity on their members, they have definite membership, and
they are abstract objects. It is understandable then, that we might mistake one for
another in our na¨ıve reasoning about classes.
The overkill constraint is also respected. We may continue to talk about proper
classes in the way we intuitively think that we do; by referring to a particular kind of
collection. In this way it nicely meshes with Monist Realism; the puzzle of Chapter
1 seems to indicate that there are precise collections which are not sets. For the
heavyweight theorist these are proper classes which exist and about which we may
talk in a singular manner.
The Heavyweight View seems to provide an ontological basis for much of our
reasoning about large cardinals. For example, embeddings from the universe into
other proper classes can be represented as proper classes of ordered pairs. In order
to be philosophically satisfied (if these grounds were not present) one would have to
explain why our (very precise) talk about such things as embeddings was mere fac¸on
de parler. This is a problem the heavyweight theorist does not encounter.
The Heavyweight View is also able to identify [COMP] as illegitimate when as-
sumed to only apply to sets. Thus it is precise. Recall [COMP]:
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[COMP] (∃C)(∀x)(x ∈ C ↔ φ(x))
One might think that ‘(∃C)’ only ranges over sets. If so, this would imply that
there is a set of all sets. This is false for the heavyweight theorist; the class of all
sets is a proper class and hence a completely different kind of object from any set.
There are proper classes, and so the existential quantifier may assert the existence of
a proper class rather than a set. In this way the Heavyweight View is precise in that
it identifies [COMP] as the guilty principle when used as a principle only about sets.
While no motivation for rejecting [COMP] as a principle only about sets has yet been
provided, the Heavyweight View allows for such motivating reasons. This will now
be given fuller consideration.
2.1.3 A Problem for The Heavyweight View; Why are Proper
Classes not Sets?
A weak objection to the Heavyweight View would be the following. The Heavyweight
View does not present a particularly ontologically parsimonious view of the set the-
oretic universe. In addition to (the already very extensive) universe of sets, we are
postulating the existence of more objects. The objection is weak for the following
reason. Set Theory is not particularly concerned with ontological parsimony of this
kind. Indeed it seems to run counter to the whole investigative process of the large
cardinal discussion; the existence of new sets is postulated, and then the consequences
of this drawn out. Generally speaking, the existence of additional entities is not of
particular theoretical concern within such a vast ontology.
However, one might press a similar thought. Under the Heavyweight View we
postulate the existence of an additional ontological kind of object. This is significant
in the way that postulating the existence of more sets is not. Postulating a distinct
kind of entity adds another layer of complexity to one’s theory. If this complexity
turns out to be redundant, the Heavyweight View would be unappealing.
It is, at this stage of the dialectic, perfectly open to the heavyweight theorist
to point out that the existence of proper classes as heavyweight objects is not a
redundant hypothesis. They would point to the motivation for holding their view;
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the facts that there are precise conditions that seem to define non-set collections
within the hierarchy, and that we require an explanation for our reasoning about
large cardinal hypotheses.
However, if one is postulating the existence of objects of a different kind, one
should have an account of why this kind of object is different from objects of other
kinds. Let us pause briefly to compare the ontological nature of proper classes on the
Heavyweight View with that of sets. It seems that proper classes and sets are very
similar. Both proper classes and sets are objects. Further, both kinds of object have
definite membership.
The resemblance between proper classes and sets is uncomfortable. The heavy-
weight theorist should not be satisfied with an arbitrary distinction between objects
of the same kind. An adequate explanation of the difference between proper classes
and sets is, therefore, particularly pressing.
I see three main ways a heavyweight theorist might explain why proper classes are
not sets:
[NMH]-Proper classes are not sets because they cannot be members.
[LSH]-Proper classes are not sets because they are ‘too big’.
[OHH]-Proper classes are not sets because they do not occur at any stage
of the Cumulative Hierarchy.
I shall argue that any of the three explanations provides the heavyweight theo-
rist with the resources to block the paradoxes. However, I will show that none of
these is an acceptable explanation for the heavyweight theorist. [NMH] and [LSH]
are unsatisfactory explanations in themselves. [OHH], on the other hand, is a good
explanation. However, it cannot be appealed to by the heavyweight theorist.
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2.2 Explaining why Proper Classes are not Sets.
2.2.1 What a Satisfactory Explanation of why Proper Classes
are not Sets Should Achieve.
Before I examine the above hypotheses, we should examine what an explanation
should achieve. For there is a difference between an explanation and a true principle.
To see the difference, suppose that I am teaching an elementary school student how
to differentiate equations. I require an explanation for why some solutions for the
value of the differential are correct, and why some are faulty. Now, unfortunately my
student repeatedly forgets that the differential of a constant with respect to x is zero.
I try to explain why she is wrong. There are a number of ways I could do this. One is
to point out that substitution of values gives her inaccurate results for the gradients
of tangents. This (in a sense) provides her with a reason why her method is wrong;
it gets the wrong answers. However, there is a deeper sense in which she is wrong,
the sense in which her reasoning does not respect the operation being performed
when finding the differential of an equation. To explain this sense would require an
explanation of how modern calculus uses the notion of the value of a function as it
approaches a limit in order to find the derivative of the function.
What can be seen from this example? In the first case we have a true principle
in the sense that the principle in play will not get a prediction wrong. If one gets
erroneous values when applying the equation one has obtained from differentiation
then the solution is incorrect (unless we are being truly obtuse and cannot compute
values correctly). In the other case, however, we are giving an explanation for why
differentiating a constant with respect to x should always be zero. It tells us why
the equation we have found is incorrect; the reasons given are descriptive of the
mathematical structure under consideration.
To make an analogy with the class paradoxes, it may very well be the case that
will we find true principles that hold of proper classes but not of sets (or vice versa).
These principles may be very useful in our reasoning; they will tell us for a particular
given collection whether or not it is a set or a proper class. However, in order to be
philosophically satisfied, we require explanation for why proper classes are not sets.
32
Such criteria will also need to respect the constraints outlined in Chapter 1.
Further, we require explanations that allow us to block the paradoxes. Merely
given the statement that proper classes are a different kind of object from sets does
not make it clear how the paradoxes should be prevented. One principle that would
allow us to block the paradoxes would be the Non-member Principle ([NMP]):
[NMP] Proper classes are not members of class-like entities.
Let us now examine how each paradox is blocked using [NMP].
Russell’s paradox depends on asking whether or not R is a member of itself. By
[NMP], proper classes are not the sort of things that can be members, thus we can say
that R is not a member of itself. There is no class of all classes that are not members
of themselves; such an object would depend on having proper classes as members.
However, there is a (proper) class of all sets that are not members of themselves.
The Burali-Forti paradox is solved using slightly different terminology between
different authors, but nonetheless still admits of a solution. The following is Go¨del’s
solution from [Go¨del, 1940]. For Go¨del an ordinal is a transitive class well-ordered
by the membership relation. He makes a distinction, however, between ordinals and
ordinal numbers; the latter are also sets. Thus there is a class of all ordinal numbers,
to be denoted by ‘On’. On is indeed well-ordered, and hence is an ordinal. It is not,
however, an ordinal number. There is no class of all ordinals.
Why is there no class of all ordinals? To do so would presuppose that On could
be a member of something (as it is an ordinal). Hence a class of all ordinals would
violate [NMP].
Cantor’s paradox is also answered. The operation of taking all subclasses of a
class is clearly an inappropriate operation for proper classes. This is because every
class is a subclass of itself (and hence a member of the class of all its subclasses).
To allow such an operation for proper classes would thus allow a proper class A to
be a member of another class (namely the class of all subclasses of A). Thus [NMP]
prohibits the taking of all subclasses of a proper class. In this way the paradox cannot
get off the ground; there is no class of all subclasses of U .
Thus we see (on the assumption of [NMP]) that we must be careful which condi-
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tions we allow into [COMPη]. For some conditions (such as ‘x a non-self-membered
class’, ‘x is an ordinal’, or ‘x is a class’) are not satisfactory conditions for proving
the existence of classes (even proper classes). If we could justify [NMP] we would also
provide motivation for rejecting [COMP] as a principle only about sets. If it were a
principle only about sets, then proper classes would be sets and hence members of
sets, thus violating [NMP].
Let us take stock. We have seen that the heavyweight theorist requires an expla-
nation for why proper classes are not sets. Further, an explanation that motivated
the acceptance of [NMP] would provide the heavyweight theorist with the resources
she needs to block the paradoxes. I shall examine three putative explanations that
might be put to this task. All, I shall argue, are of no use to the heavyweight theorist.
2.2.2 The Non-member Hypothesis.
Given the use to which we can put [NMP], maybe the heavyweight theorist should
appeal to this as explanation for the difference between proper classes and sets. I will
call this view the Non-Member Hypothesis ([NMH]):
[NMH] Proper classes are not sets because proper classes (unlike sets)
cannot be members.
This explanation of why proper classes are not sets would clearly allow us to assert
that proper classes are not members. [NMP] would be immediate; inferred from the
very explanatory feature of the difference between proper classes and sets.
It should be noted that the phrase ‘cannot be members’ is ambiguous. Does it
mean that proper classes cannot be members of sets, or classes in general? The method
by which the class paradoxes are blocked ([NMP]) involves the fact that proper classes
cannot be members of other proper classes. There (2.2.1) it was noted that one must
be careful to not use conditions in [COMP] that would make proper classes members,
even of other proper classes. For example, ‘x is a non-self-membered class’ was just
such a condition. It is thus clear that to be effective [NMH] must state that proper
classes are not members of classes of all kinds. With this in mind, let us see if [NMH]
is a satisfactory explanation.
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2.2.2.1 Positive Remarks about [NMH].
It would be highly desirable for [NMH] to be a satisfactory explanation for why proper
classes are not sets for the heavyweight theorist. If it were a good explanation, then
the method for preventing the paradoxes and explanation for why proper classes are
not sets would perfectly mesh.
Further, [NMH] is precise; it tells us clearly which part of our reasoning was
faulty. As noted earlier in 2.2.1, we might mistakenly allow conditions that allow
proper classes to be members into [COMPη]. This can be identified as the faulty step
in the derivation of the paradoxes.
A diagnosis can also be given by the [NMH] theorist. Pre-theoretically, it is unclear
why we should expect proper classes not to be members of sets. After all they are
precise mathematical objects. Given this, why should they not be members?
2.2.2.2 Why [NMH] is Unsatisfactory.
This, however, points the way to an objection to [NMH]. What is the structural feature
of proper classes that prevents them being members (aside from paradox)? Proper
classes are precise objects with definite membership. Why then should they not be
members? We would like our class theory to be the most comprehensive theory of
collections possible. Given this we require reasons why there are objects that cannot
be taken as members of classes. [NMH] seems to not be a basic explanation, but
rather demands justification. It seems ad hoc, a putative explanation designed merely
to allow us to block the paradoxes. If [NMP] is true, then we want to know why proper
classes cannot be members.
The situation is made worse by the fact that having proper classes be members
is not in itself the root of the contradiction. For there are systems that allow proper
classes to be members of other classes but are consistent relative to ZFC (and hence
also V NBG7). Ackermann’s A, for example, is a system that allows a proper class
to be a member of another proper class, and is a conservative extension of ZFC
([Fraenkel et al., 1973], p153). Given that it is possible to develop such systems, it
7This is because V NBG is a conservative extension of ZFC, i.e. all theorems of V NBG in the
language of ZFC are theorems of ZFC.
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seems unlikely that proper classes being members is in itself the cause of the paradoxes.
For these reasons, [NMH] is poorly motivated. There seems to be no good reason
to accept why proper classes cannot be members. In fact, there is pressure to accept
the converse. We want our class theory to be the most comprehensive account of
collections possible. Given that proper classes are (on the Heavyweight View) precise
objects, we should be able to talk about collections thereof. Further to this, we can
construct consistent systems where proper classes are members. [NMH] thus fails as
an explanation for why proper classes are not sets.
2.2.3 The Limitation of Size Hypothesis.
It seems then we not only require an explanation of why proper classes are not sets,
but also principled reasons for rejecting the idea that proper classes can be members
of other classes. The Limitation of Size Hypothesis attempts to provide the ground
for [NMP].
One may state the Limitation of Size Hypothesis as follows:
[LSH] Proper classes are not sets because proper classes are ‘too big’.
If [LSH] were true, one could motivate [NMP]. If the reason that proper classes
are not sets is that they are too big then it is plausible that a class could not contain
a proper class. For, if a proper class is too big to be a set then one might think that
it is also too big to be contained within a class.
What is meant by ‘too big’? This, as we shall see, is a hard question to answer.
However, one might think that it is somehow part of the Iterative Conception that it
only allows sets of a certain size. All the (pure) sets that exist are constructed out ∅,
the power set operation, and the process of taking unions at limits. We might expect
then that something larger than anything that occurs at any Vα cannot be a set
8.
This is, as it stands, still quite inexact. However, it can be made more precise.
First, let ‘Set(A)’ stand for ‘A is a set’ and ‘A ≈ B’ stand for ‘A and B may be
correlated one-to-one’. One may then formulate [LSH] in the following way:
8I put aside for the moment questions about whether inaccessible cardinals (that cannot be
reached in this manner) are sets. However, this fact about defining stronger axioms of infinity will
become important later in evaluating [LSH].
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[LSHF ] (∀A)(Set(A)→ ¬A ≈ On)
This states that if A is a set it is not possible to correlate A one-to-one with the
ordinal numbers. Hence, if one can correlate A one-to-one with the ordinal numbers,
then A is not a set (and thus A is a proper class).
We now have a precise formulation of [LSH]. One must now ask whether or not it
is satisfactory as an explanation for why proper classes are not sets.
2.2.3.1 Positive Remarks about [LSH].
It should be noted that [LSH] provides a perfectly precise criterion for when an object
is a proper class. [LSHF ] is true; a class forms a set unless one can map the class
onto the ordinal numbers.
Therefore, theories that use [LSH] are precise. Firstly, as noted earlier (2.2.2),
[COMP] violates [NMP]. As [NMP] is supported by [LSH], it seems then that [LSH]
implies the falsity of [COMP]. However, [LSH] is also precise in the sense that it
identifies the use of [COMP] as a principle only about sets as erroneous; a class
defined by a condition φ(x) can be of any size. Furthermore, [LSHF ] provides us with
a true principle about proper classes and sets.
There is also a diagnosis available. It is not obvious why considerations of size
would be relevant to whether or not a given class is a set. One notion of size, the
concept of cardinality, can be quite unusual (especially in the infinite case). Consider
the proof that the set of rational numbers is equinumerous with the set of natural
numbers. Such a result is, pre-theoretically, quite unexpected. After all, there are
infinitely many rational numbers between the natural numbers 0 and 1! Now, one
may not ascribe cardinality to proper classes. Rather, proper classes ‘transcend’ all
cardinality. What is meant by this? It can be elucidated by means of an analogy with
the real line. Consider the question ‘What is the length of the real line?’. It seems
this question has no answer. One should say instead that the real line ‘transcends’ all
length; it is so indefinitely long that one cannot ascribe to it a length. This parallels
proper classes and cardinality; they are so indefinitely large that they cannot be
given a cardinality. The notion of a one-to-one mapping is central, however, both
to cardinality and to [LSHF ]. This makes it plausible that in a similar way, both
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cardinality results (such as the fact that N ≈ Q) and results involving [LSHF ] (for
example; the class of all non-self-membered sets is not a set) might be surprising and
unexpected.
Despite these good features of [LSH], it is unsatisfactory. It fails as an explanation
because it is poorly motivated. Moreover, there is a worry that it violates overkill
that (when scrutinised closely) reveals a circularity within [LSH].
2.2.3.2 Why [LSH] is Unsatisfactory.
I will examine the charge of overkill first. If we think that the explanation for why
proper classes are not sets is [LSH], we should have an account of why each of the
axioms that describes the universe of sets does not produce sets that are ‘too large’.
One of these axioms will be the Axiom of Power Set.
[POWER] ∀x∃y∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ⊆ x)
As we can see [POWER] asserts that there is a set of all subsets of a given set.
There are reasons to want [POWER] as part of our theory, of which I will now survey
some9.
Firstly, it merely seems intuitive to say that we can take the set of subsets of a
given set. If we have the set in question, then we have the elements that make up the
set, and hence one might think we have the set of all possible combinations of such
elements.
Mere intuition, however, is not enough. Nonetheless, it seems that the notion
of Power Set is somehow ‘written into’ the Cumulative Hierarchy. Recall how the
Cumulative Hierarchy was defined in Chapter 1; for any Vα there is a stage Vα+1
such that Vα+1 = Vα ∪ P(Vα). In order to know about the sets at any Vα+1 we must
effectively consider all subcollections of Vα. The Power Set operation is thus integral
to our understanding of the Cumulative Hierarchy.
Further, there is a sizeable amount of mathematical pressure to want [POWER].
As Hallett, notes, the power set of any set x represents the set of all extensions of
9There are many more reasons that have been discussed in the literature (see [Hallett, 1984] for
discussion). As my project is not to justify the Power Set Axiom, I have not given it a thorough
treatment. It is necessary to see, however, that it is a highly desirable principle to have in one’s
theory, and one that responds to the Iterative Conception.
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properties on x ([Hallett, 1984], p206). [POWER] is also very useful in other branches
of mathematics; in probability theory, for example, the power set of the sample space
is the set of all possible events.
Given that it is desirable to adopt [POWER], how can the [LSH] theorist argue
that we should indeed use it as an axiom?
It is clear that power sets will be ‘small’ in the finite case. I suggest, however,
that it is very unclear how someone who holds [LSH] can argue that power sets are
small in the infinite case, even for the smallest infinite set.
This set is ω; the set of all natural numbers. Let ‘P(ω)’ denote its power set. Let
us take one measure of set size; cardinality. What can we say about the cardinality
of such a class? Is it ‘small’?
The fact of the matter is, we have little idea of the cardinality of P(ω). One thing
we do know (by Cantor’s theorem) is that it must be strictly greater than |ω|.
That is, however, pretty much all we know about it. Thanks to the work of Go¨del
and Cohen ([Go¨del, 1940], [Cohen, 1963]), we know that the cardinality of P(ω) is
independent of the axioms of ZFC10. It is impossible to prove, from axioms that
arise naturally out of the Iterative Conception, exactly what the cardinality of P(ω)
is.
The [LSH] theorist may respond that P(ω) is in fact ‘small’, citing the fact that
its cardinality is strictly smaller than |P(P(ω))|. This is, however, no response; it
is precisely the nature of the set P(ω) that under scrutiny. This argument requires
P(ω) to be a set (and hence the sort of thing to which we may apply the power set
operation) in order to be effective.
A different response available to the [LSH] theorist is that we cannot map a sub-
class of P(ω) onto the ordinals and thus it is small. This is an acceptable response to
the problem of the cardinality of P(ω) only if one thinks that not being able to map a
class one-to-one with the ordinal numbers is an acceptable measure of set ‘smallness’.
I think that there is good evidence to suggest that the [LSH] theorist’s appeal to the
ordinal numbers as the ‘measuring stick’ of class size is not satisfactory. Indeed it
seems to point to a deep philosophical circularity.
10Due to the fact that V NBG is a conservative extension of ZFC, this will mean that the cardi-
nality of P(ω) is also independent of the axioms of V NBG.
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Using [LSHF ], how does one show that a class fails to form a set? One must show
that one can map a subset of the class onto the ordinals. One may then conclude
that the class is at least as big as the ordinals and (as the ordinals are a proper class)
the class in question cannot be a set. So far so good. But what reason can the [LSH]
theorist give for why the ordinal numbers do not form a set? They might simply say
that the ordinal numbers are ‘too big’. But how do we know that they are ‘too big’?
One could note that one can map the ordinal numbers one-to-one with the ordinal
numbers. But this is obviously circular! The only other option seems to be to point to
the fact that paradox would ensue if we did not assume them to be ‘too big’. But this
is clearly no response if [LSH] is to provide an explanation. [LSH] theory operates by
taking a class that one assumes to be too big, and then showing that other classes are
too big in relation to this class. But to do so, as Linnebo notes, is merely to “move
in a tiny circle” ([Linnebo, 2010], p154).
Given that it is (at the very least) dubious whether or not [LSH] can avoid overkill,
let us examine its motivation.
It seems to me that [LSH] fundamentally mistakes the nature of sets. Why should
we think that considerations of size have bearing on whether or not a class is a set?
Sets are abstract objects, some of which are extremely large. Why should they
reach a certain point and then ‘overflow’? For any set in the Cumulative Hierarchy
there is always another set of greater cardinality. Paradoxes arise because we na¨ıvely
hold two or more contradictory principles about a notion. It must be that when we
assume that a proper class is a set we have inadvertently accepted a proposition that
entails the negation of one we already hold. It is hard to see, once we accept the
varying cardinalities and sheer enormity of the transfinite sets, how it should be the
size of proper classes that is the root of the contradiction.
This point is backed up by current work in Set Theory. It is a fact of set theo-
retical practice that where set theorists can they have defined larger and larger sets.
This is done by extending the standard axioms of ZFC by so called ‘large cardinal
axioms’ that assert the existence of very large sets. Such practice can be done (we
think consistently), against the backdrop of the Cumulative Hierarchy. Large car-
dinal axioms effectively operate like the Axiom of Infinity that asserts the existence
40
of the first infinite set, ω. They simply posit that other (stronger) kinds of infinite
set exist, and the Cumulative Hierarchy can then proceed from these objects. If size
considerations were somehow ‘written into’ the Iterative Conception, one would think
that this would not be possible. Given that we can define sets of larger and larger
size, it seems arbitrary to insist that size is the key difference between sets and proper
classes.
[LSH] then, while associated with a true principle, is not explanatory. It seems
unable to account for [POWER], looks unavoidably circular, and fails to chime with
our basic notion of set. The heavyweight theorist should, therefore, look elsewhere in
drawing the distinction between proper classes and sets.
2.2.4 The Occurrence in the Hierarchy Hypothesis.
However, examination of [LSH] reveals a different explanation one might give for why
proper classes do not form sets.
While [LSH] was seen to be unsatisfactory, one can learn a great deal from the
way it was expressed by its original proponents.
Bar-Hillel, Fraenkel, and Levy express the view as follows:
“...we do not admit very comprehensive sets in order to avoid the anti-
monies” ([Fraenkel et al., 1973], p135)
Fraenkel himself (in [Fraenkel, 1927]) states that (if we use his axioms):
“...the scope of the new set is never boundless” (p116)
and also
“...in this way, the possibility that a set could be constituted by the com-
pletely limitless assignment of elements is avoided from the beginning”
(p118)
When expressing [LSH], its advocates used words such as ‘bound’, ‘limit’, and
‘extent’. There is a sense in which the fact that proper classes not being sets is bound
up with such notions. The reason proper classes are not sets is that (owing to the
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extendible nature of the conditions by which they are defined) they do not appear at
any Vα. This was noted to be a structural feature of the Iterative Conception.
Perhaps then the heavyweight theorist should make us of this fact and appeal to
the following explanation for why proper classes are not sets:
[OHH] Proper classes are not sets because sets occur at some Vα of the
Cumulative Hierarchy whereas proper classes do not appear at any Vα.
We might motivate [NMP] from [OHH] as follows. In order to be a member of
either a set or a proper class, an object must appear in the Cumulative Hierarchy.
Proper classes themselves, however, appear at no Vα. Thus they cannot be members
of either sets or proper classes.
I shall argue that [OHH] is indeed a good explanation. It is, however, one to which
the heavyweight theorist cannot appeal.
2.2.4.1 Positive Remarks about [OHH].
[OHH] is precise. Assuming the adequacy of [OHH] as an explanation, because [OHH]
supports [NMP] it will imply that using conditions that would allow proper classes to
be members in [COMP] is illegitimate. However, we can also see that [COMP] is not
a correct principle to tell us what sets exist. Any sets that exist occur at some Vα
and so are not defined by extendible conditions. [COMP], however, admits extendible
conditions and so (if assumed to be a principle only about sets) will prove the existence
of such sets. Thus [OHH] shows that using [COMP] as a principle that applies only to
sets, combined with the Iterative Conception, is equivalent to accepting that certain
sets both do and do not exist.
Moreover, [OHH] is clearly well motivated. For it responds exactly to a structural
feature of the Cumulative Hierarchy in relation to the extendibility property of certain
conditions that was noted in Chapter 1. In this way, it is obtained directly from our
notion of set given by the Iterative Conception.
[OHH] further provides a diagnosis. It is not obvious that for certain conditions
there will be no set of all its satisfiers in the Cumulative Hierarchy. This only becomes
apparent when we closely examine the nature of the Cumulative Hierarchy, and the
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fact that certain conditions have an extendibility property that will prevent a set of
all their satisfiers occurring at some Vα.
Moreover [OHH] does not violate overkill. It is a controversial issue what large
cardinal sets exist. Such an issue in itself deserves a good deal of philosophical consid-
eration. Unfortunately I lack the space to examine the question closely here. However,
if a particular large cardinal set exists it can be introduced into the Cumulative Hi-
erarchy and the resulting structure researched without problem11. The process is not
much different from the way in which the Axiom of Infinity asserts the existence of the
first infinite set, ω. Disagreements on what large cardinal sets exist will be reflected
in a disagreement as to the extent of the Cumulative Hierarchy. If one thinks that a
certain set exists, then there is a stage of the Cumulative Hierarchy that contains it.
Thus the Cumulative Hierarchy does not prohibit reasoning about such sets, provided
justification can be given for their existence.
2.2.4.2 Why the Heavyweight Theorist Cannot Appeal to [OHH].
We have seen then, that [OHH] is a satisfactory explanation for the difference between
proper classes and sets. This is not the end of the story, however; one must also show
that one’s theory is able to use [OHH]. It is my contention that the heavyweight
theorist cannot use [OHH].
Recall the failure of [NMH]. It was seen there (2.2.2.2) that, given the fact that
proper classes are precise objects, they should be members of other classes.
Thus proper classes should be members of non-set classes12. Following Fraenkel,
Bar-Hillel, and Levy I will call such things hyper-classes13 ([Fraenkel et al., 1973],
p142). Every class is a hyper-class. Further, hyper-classes have definite membership.
Given that the heavyweight theorist accepts that proper classes are objects, it seems
that they should also accept that hyper-classes are objects. This is because there is no
reason for hyper-classes to not be objects that would not also apply to proper classes.
11Providing, of course, that the relevant large cardinal axiom is consistent.
12As the focus of this thesis is philosophical, I will put aside the technical problem of how to block
the paradoxes with proper classes as members. There are systems (such as Ackermann’s theory)
that block the paradoxes but allow proper classes as members.
13One might, instead of defining a new kind of class, simply say that proper classes are members
of other proper classes. The difference is purely one of nomenclature; I use the term ‘hyper-class’
simply to mark the fact that we have moved on from the picture where proper classes could not be
members (and hence could not have proper classes as members).
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The claim that they should not be objects as they have proper classes as members is
clearly not going to work. The above arguments show that proper classes (under the
Heavyweight View) are objects in a similar manner to sets (except that they do not
appear at any Vα of the Cumulative Hierarchy). Given the similarity between proper
classes and hyper-classes, the heavyweight theorist should accept that hyper-classes
are also a kind of object. Therefore, any hyper-classes can be a member of some other
hyper-class14.
Let hyper-classes be denoted by the letters ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and so on. Let the hyper-
class membership relation be represented by ‘A’. Immediately we may want to for-
mulate some plausible principles about hyper-classes. A natural principle to adopt
might be the following:
[H-COMP] (∃A)(∀B)[B A A↔ φ(B)]
Of course, [H-COMP] is going to be inconsistent. If we let φ ↔df B 6A B we will
get exactly parallel reasoning to the original Russell paradox about sets:
We have:
(∀B)[B A {A : A 6A A} ↔ B 6A B] (by [H-COMP].)
Therefore:
{A : A 6A A} A {A : A 6A A} ↔ {A : A 6A A} 6A {A : A 6A A}] (by
substituting {A : A 6A A} for B bound by universal quantifier)

Thus we have a problem; our na¨ıve hyper-class theory is inconsistent. However,
hyper-classes are just another object-like collection with definite membership. Not
only this, proper classes seem to be ‘formed’ in a similar manner to sets. To see
this, consider any Vα of the Cumulative Hierarchy. What is the relation of sets
formed at Vα+1 to Vα? The sets formed at Vα+1 are subcollections of Vα that are
not members of Vα. Now let the Cumulative Hierarchy be denoted by ‘V ’. Proper
14At this point, I depart from Bar-Hillel, Fraenkel, and Levy’s exposition of the hyper-class struc-
ture. This is because Fraenkel et al do not draw out the philosophical consequences (i.e. that
hyper-classes are objects that can be members) of holding both that proper classes are objects with
definite membership, and that hyper-classes have definite membership.
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classes are subcollections of V that are not members of V . Thus proper classes bear
the same relation to V as sets formed at Vα+1 bear to Vα. One might argue then that
hyper-classes should (like sets) obey our principles of collection forming. In order to
maintain cohesion with our basic notion of collection, the hyper-classes should be part
of a hierarchical structure extending the original Cumulative Hierarchy. Thus, while
the Cumulative Hierarchy contains stages, the stages of the hyper-class structure are
distinct from these stages . I shall, therefore, use a different symbol to represent
the stages the hyper-class structure. Let the stages of the hyper-class structure be
indexed by ordinals and denoted by ‘Vα’ (as opposed to the Vα of the Cumulative
Hierarchy). We may then define the hyper-class structure as follows:
Let V0 contain all hyper-classes that are either a pure set or a proper class
containing only pure sets15.
For any ordinal number α let Vα+1 = Vα ∪ P(Vα)
For limit ordinal λ there is a Vλ such that Vλ = ∪Vβ,β<λ.
This structure I shall refer to as ‘V’ (a pictorial representation of V is provided in
Figure 2.1 at the end of this Chapter). The heavyweight theorist might thus claim
that she has a satisfactory way of allowing proper classes to be members of other class-
like objects while maintaining cohesion with our collection forming practice. She can
hold on to [OHH] as a principle about the Cumulative Hierarchy, while allowing that
proper classes appear in stages of V.
If she were to claim this, however, she would be wrong. I see two objections to
the theory. One of the criticisms is weak, the other fatal.
Firstly, one might quite simply find the picture intuitively distasteful. It seems
that we are replicating a cumulative structure on top of our first Cumulative Hierarchy.
The hyper-classes that occur as part of V look very similar to the sets of V . Are we
not just replicating the same structure again?
The obvious response is to deny that V and V are the same structure. No hyper-
class within the Cumulative Hierarchy contains a hyper-class one may map one-to-one
15Once again, the restriction to pure sets and proper classes containing pure sets is merely a
matter of simplicity. One could quite easily extend the structure to include hyper-classes that
contain urelemente.
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with the ordinals. V does contain such a hyper-class. At no point in V do we get
classes that contain a proper class and a set. In V we have many such things, for
example {∅, On} will be a hyper-class.
However, there is a very strong objection to the structure V. Any theory of proper
classes should be able to solve the paradoxes and the puzzle for Monist Realism set
out in Chapter 1. Anyone who holds Monist Realism and uses the structure V, should
hold the following:
(Monist Realism)V The structure V has the following properties:
1. The hyper-classes are objects.
2. V is a ‘complete’ abstract structure; for every ordinal α, Vα exists.
No new Vα are being created.
3. For any object x, it is definite whether or not x occurs in V.
4. There is only one V (although isomorphic copies of it may exist within
universes of sets with different urelemente).
5. There is just one interpretation of V. Our quantifiers are not am-
biguous; it is possible to quantify over all hyper-classes.
Now, consider the following definitions used to define the concept hyper-ordinal.
I shall use the capital Greek letters ‘Γ’, ‘∆’, ‘Λ’ etc. to represent hyper-ordinals; a
certain kind of hyper-class:
Definition. (1) {0n} is a hyper-ordinal.
Definition. (2) If Γ is a hyper-ordinal then so is Γ ∪ {Γ}.
Definition. (3) Λ is a hyper-ordinal if for some limit ordinal λ:
Λ = ∪{Γ : ∃β < λ, Γ is a hyper-ordinal in Vβ}.
Definition. (4) Nothing but the hyper-classes satisfying one of the above
clauses count as hyper-ordinals16.
16The term ‘hyper-ordinal’ was chosen as the construction of the hyper-ordinals in V clearly mimics
the construction of the von Neumann ordinal numbers in V . There are some disanalogies, however.
For example, the hyper-ordinals are not transitive hyper-classes; there are members of a member of
{0n} that are not members of {0n}. To see this, observe that all the von Neumann ordinal numbers
are members of On, but not members of {0n}.
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Now we may prove a result about hyper-ordinals:
Theorem. The hyper-ordinals do not appear as a hyper-class at any Vα
of V.
Proof. To prove this, it will be sufficient to prove that for any ordinal α
indexing Vα there are hyper-ordinals outside Vα. This will ensure that all
the hyper-ordinals are never all present at some particular Vα, and thus
there is no hyper-class of all hyper-ordinals formed at any Vα+1.
We use transfinite induction on the ordinals.
(i) We first must show that there are hyper-ordinals outside V0. It is clear
that there are hyper-ordinals outside V0 (e.g. {On}).
(ii) We must then show that if α indexes Vα and there are hyper-ordinals
outside Vα, then there are hyper-ordinals outside Vα+1. Assume then that
α indexes Vα and that there are hyper-ordinals outside Vα. Then there
are are hyper-ordinals in some Vβ>α that are not in Vα. If this is the case,
then either:
a) There are hyper-ordinals in Vα+1 that are not in Vα.
or b) There are hyper-ordinals in Vγ>(α+1) that are not in Vα.
(ii)b) If there are hyper-ordinals at some Vγ>(α+1) there are hyper-ordinals
outside Vα+1.
(ii)a) Therefore, assume that there are hyper-ordinals at Vα+1. Let Γ be
one. But then (by the definition of hyper-ordinals) Γ∪{Γ} is also a hyper-
ordinal. Since (by assumption) Γ is not in Vα, Γ ∪ {Γ} is first formed at
Vα+2. Hence there are hyper-ordinals outside Vα+1.
(iii) Finally, let λ be a limit ordinal indexing some Vλ of V. Assume that
for all β < λ there is a hyper-ordinal outside Vβ . Now (by Definition 3)
the hyper-class Λ = ∪{Γ : ∃β < λ, Γ is a hyper-ordinal in Vβ}, is a hyper-
ordinal. Further, for any hyper-ordinal Γ formed at a Vβ , where β < λ,
there is a hyper-ordinal outside Vβ at Vβ+1, namely Γ∪{Γ}17. Moreover, as
17Though we already have the fact that there is a hyper-ordinal outside Vβ (by assumption) it is
useful to see that at every Vβ there is a new hyper-ordinal formed at each Vβ+1.
47
λ is a limit ordinal (and hence not a successor), for any β < λ, (β+1) < λ.
Therefore, as
Λ = ∪{Γ : ∃β < λ, Γ is a hyper-ordinal in Vβ}
Λ cannot appear at any Vβ<λ for the reason that there will be a hyper-
ordinal ∆ in the hyper-ordinal Λ such that ∆ is outside Vβ . In addition,
Vλ is (by definition) ∪Vβ,β<λ. Thus, no new hyper-classes are formed at
Vλ. Hence, Λ must be formed at some Vα, α > λ. Therefore, there are
hyper-ordinals outside Vλ.
Thus we have shown that (i) There are hyper-ordinals outside V0, (ii)
If α is an ordinal indexing Vα and there are hyper-ordinals outside Vα
then there are hyper-ordinals outside Vα+1, and (iii) If λ is a limit ordinal
indexing Vλ, and for every β < λ there are hyper-ordinals outside Vβ , then
there are hyper-ordinals outside Vλ. By transfinite induction then, there
are hyper-ordinals outside Vα for all α. Hence there is no hyper-class of
all hyper-ordinals, as all the hyper-ordinals do not appear at any Vα to
then appear as a hyper-class at Vα+1.

But now we have an analogous problem to the one that faced the heavyweight
theorist about the original Cumulative Hierarchy. The predicate ‘A is a hyper-ordinal’
is definite; for any hyper-class A there is a fact of the matter whether or not it is a
hyper-ordinal. Further, it is definite what hyper-classes occur in V. Thus we have a
condition with a definite range of satisfiers (so in some sense a ‘collection’), that is not
a hyper-class. What then is the ontological nature of this collection of hyper-classes?
Given that when a virtually identical puzzle was presented about sets in Chap-
ter 1, and the heavyweight theorist responded to it by postulating the existence of
heavyweight proper classes, we can expect a similar response. Similarly, we can then
expect an analogous principle to [OHH] to be appealed to to explain the difference
between these ‘collections’ and hyper-classes. Let us pause briefly in order to clear
up nomenclature with respect to hyper-classes:
Definition. Let a 0-hyper-class be any hyper-class that occurs first in
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the Cumulative Hierarchy V (i.e. the sets).
Definition. Let a 1-hyper-class be any hyper-class that occurs first in V.
We can then restate [OHH] as follows:
[OHH]1 The difference between 0-hyper-classes and 1-hyper-classes is that
0-hyper-classes appear in the 0-hyper-class structure where 1-hyper-classes
do not.
To deal with the non-hyper-class forming collections, the heavyweight theorist is
forced to introduce the following objects:
Definition. Let a 2-hyper-class be a collection of hyper-classes that does
not appear in V.
Once again, the heavyweight theorist will want to develop plausible principles
about this kind of object. Again, they will be driven to defining a new, ‘2-hyper-
class’ structure that extends V. And once again, they will need to give an ontological
characterisation of these 2-hyper-classes as follows:
[OHH]2 The difference between 1-hyper-classes and 2-hyper-classes is that
1-hyper-classes appear in the 1-hyper-class structure where 2-hyper-classes
do not.
Yet again, I will be able to define some extendible condition for this kind of object
that will raise a similar puzzle to the one outlined in Chapter 1. The heavyweight
theorist will then be forced to move to 3-hyper-classes, with a corresponding [OHH]3
for the 3-hyper-class structure. Should we continue and move to 4-hyper-classes? n-
hyper-classes for any natural number n? Even given this, one will always be able to
define some extendible condition that is definite, but does not occur in any structure.
Should we move to α-hyper-classes for any ordinal α?
One can do this, all the while pushing the puzzle back further. I think it is time
to review, however, the situation in which the heavyweight theorist now finds herself.
There are three problems with her position.
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First, the game being played is no longer convincing. Proper classes were mo-
tivated as a way of dealing with collections that (if assumed to be sets) produce
paradoxes. It is now obvious that the heavyweight theorist’s principles have forced
her to merely move the puzzle of Chapter 1 further and further back. There is no
solution to the puzzle here, just a reallocation to a different order of class.
Second, we should carefully scrutinise what our theory of classes is for. It seemed
to be a formalisation of our notion of collection. It might be plausible that there is
more than one notion of ‘collection’ we use in our reasoning18. It is not plausible that
we have infinitely many notions of collection packed into our more general concept of
collection.
The heavyweight theorist might retreat and point out that any collection I point
to will at least appear in some α-hyper-class structure, even if it is an (α+ 1)-hyper-
class structure of α-hyper-classes. This, however, points to the third problem for the
heavyweight theorist. There are extendible conditions such that the relevant collection
of all satisfiers never appears in any α-hyper-class hierarchy. The condition ‘x = x’,
when applied to any α-hyper-class will have a definite range of satisfiers that is not
an α-hyper-class. But consider all α-hyper-class hierarchies. Within these hierarchies
there is still a definite range of objects that satisfy ‘x = x’ (i.e. everything). This
definite range of objects does not form an α-hyper-class of any kind. In the end,
the Heavyweight theorist will always be unable to give an account of certain definite
collections of objects.
2.2.4.3 Conclusion about [OHH].
We have seen that [OHH] is a good explanation for why proper classes are not sets.
However, we have seen that the heavyweight theorist cannot appeal to [OHH]. Any
attempt to do so would (using other principles she holds), result in a proliferation of
hierarchies. This merely shifts the puzzle higher and higher. Furthermore, it seems
to splinter our seemingly simple notion of collection into infinitely many different
notions. Finally, in the end, the Heavyweight View is still unable to account for
certain definite collections.
18I shall argue later that this is indeed the case.
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2.3 Conclusions.
Let us take stock. We have seen that the Heavyweight View, while it is appealing
at first, does not in itself provide an explanation for why proper classes are not sets.
Further, the putative explanations considered are not satisfactory for the heavyweight
theorist. [NMH] and [LSH] are deeply flawed as explanations. [OHH], on the other
hand, could not be appealed to by the heavyweight theorist. However, during our
discussion we did identify [OHH] as an adequate explanation for why proper classes
are not sets; proper classes (unlike sets) do not appear at any Vα of the Cumulative
Hierarchy. It would be sensible, therefore, to examine proposals that make use of this
fact.
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Figure 2.1: The structure V.
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Chapter 3
Modal Views of Proper
Classes.
We saw in the last Chapter that there were significant problems with taking proper
classes to be heavyweight objects. An obvious route to take then is to deny the
objecthood of proper classes. However, merely stating this attitude does not yet
explain why proper classes can figure meaningfully in our discourse.
In this Chapter, I examine two accounts that deny the objecthood of proper classes
that may be extracted from the work of Charles Parsons1. My strategy is as follows:
• In 3.1 I examine some excerpts from Parsons’ (and related authors’) writings. I
draw out the features of proper classes presented by these texts.
• In 3.2 I examine and reject one view of proper classes that may be extracted
from the above writings; ‘The Modal Function View’. I argue that a basic notion
of the view is problematic.
• In 3.3 I analyse a different account about proper classes that one might hold
based on the passages of section 3.1; ‘The Projection View’. I reject it for the
reason that it cannot explain one of the notions central to its expression.
1His view is largely developed in several papers in his Mathematics in Philosophy: Selected Essays,
Cornell University Press, 1983.
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I will show that none of the accounts I consider are satisfactory from the perspec-
tive of a Monist Realist.
3.1 What Parsons Said.
A substantial problem when trying to give an exegesis of Parsons’ view of proper
classes is that the exposition of his ideas is not clear. This is partly due to the
fact that his view is partially articulated across several papers2. However, it is also
because the main aim of the paper in which his most detailed discussion of proper
classes occurs (‘What is the Iterative Conception of Set’) does not have as its main aim
a characterisation of proper classes. Rather, Parsons sought to give an explanation of
the Iterative Conception of Set, without using the metaphor of construction in stages.
Thus his remarks on proper classes are something of a side note. The views
he expresses there are by no means developed. Nonetheless, Parsons’ account may
provide the Monist Realist with the resources she needs to characterise proper classes.
For this reason, I will not give a detailed exegesis of Parsons. Rather I will select
some passages from his papers, and state what features of proper classes we may
extract from these. I will then draw out and evaluate two characterisations of proper
classes one might give based on some of these features.
We saw in the last Chapter that we require an account of proper classes on which
proper classes are not heavyweight objects. Parsons’ view provides just such a char-
acterisation. He says the following:
(A) “...we should think of predicates whose ‘extensions’ are proper classes
as really not having fixed extensions.” ([Parsons, 1977], p291)
I take an extension to be a heavyweight object3. Here we see Parsons arguing that
if the objects that satisfy a predicate do not form a set, then the predicate does not
actually have an extension (in the normal sense of ‘extension’).
Parsons’ account provides the resources for a modal characterisation of proper
classes. The point is put in his article ‘What Is the Iterative Conception of Set?’ in
2See [Parsons, 1974b], [Parsons, 1974a], [Parsons, 1977] and [Parsons, 1983b].




(B) “Indeed Reinhardt has suggested that proper classes differ from sets
in that under counterfactual conditions they might have had different
elements” ([Parsons, 1977], p286)
The Reinhardt paper indicated is ‘Remarks on Reflection Principles, Large Car-
dinals, and Elementary Embeddings’ and contains the following on proper classes:
(C) “A proper class P may...be distinguished from a set x in the follow-
ing way...if there were more ordinals...x would have the same members,
whereas P would necessarily have new elements. We could say that the
extension of x is fixed but that of P depends on what sets exist. Roughly,
x is its extension, whereas P has more to it than that” ([Reinhardt, 1974],
p196).
What can we glean from these two passages? (B) states that the difference be-
tween proper classes and sets is that if A is a proper classes then in some non-actual
circumstance A would have members it does not actually have or A would lack mem-
bers it actually has. Sets on the other hand have the same members in every possible
circumstance, both actual and non-actual.
The distinguishing feature of proper classes is put in a slightly different way in
(C). This claims that if A is a proper class, then if there were more ordinals, A would
have member(s) it does not actually have. However, if A is a set, then if there were
more ordinals, A would have just the members it actually has.
Parsons thus argues that set membership is rigid where proper class membership
is not rigid4. (B) and (C) put this point slightly differently. (B) suggests that proper
4We might formalise this notion of rigidity as follows:
(R ∈) x ∈ y → (x ∈ y)
(R 6∈) x 6∈ y → (x 6∈ y)
However, as Parsons points out ([Parsons, 1983b], p298-301; [Parsons, 1977], p286-287) the status
of the existence of proper classes is at issue. He therefore proposes an existence dependent treatment
of rigidity which he formalises by the following three principles:
(E0 ∈) x ∈ y → E(x) ∧ E(y)
(R0 ∈) x ∈ y → (E(y)→ x ∈ y)
(R0 6∈) x 6∈ y ∧ E(y)→ (x 6∈ y)
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classes in some possible world might have different members. (C), on the other hand,
states that if there were more ordinals a proper class would have more members.
Central to (B) and (C) is a notion of modality. This will be very important for
the discussion of Parsons’ view. A modal notion one might use is that of intensions.
Parsons says the following:
(D) “Reinhardt himself suggests...a class x is an intension..” ([Parsons, 1977],
p287)
Parsons (as he endorses Reinhardt’s characterisation of proper classes5) is commit-
ted to proper classes being intensional. Exactly what is meant by ‘intensional’ is not
entirely clear. Carnap, when introducing the notion of intension said the following:
4-14. The extension of a predicator (of degree one) is the corresponding
class.
4-15. The intension of a predicator (of degree one) is the corresponding
property. ([Carnap, 1947], p19).
So, the statement that proper classes are intensional could be interpreted as saying
that proper classes are properties. However, it seems that we want to say that proper
classes are extensional, in the sense that if they have the same members then they are
the same class. In this way we are able to say that the Russell Class and Universal
Class are the same class6. It is also clear that the property of being non-self-membered
is quite a different property from the property of being self-identical. Thus it does
not seem right to say that proper classes are properties, it seems to imply that two
proper class that we take to be the same are in fact not the same.
I do not think that Parsons provides a fully clear account of how to interpret these principles.
I will, therefore, leave ‘rigidity of membership’ as an unformalised notion. The core idea is simple
enough; sets have the same members in every possible world, proper classes could have different
members in some possible world.
5See, for example, the following passage from [Parsons, 1977] (p286): “I am endorsing this sugges-
tion [i.e. Reinhardt’s Proposal] as an explication of the intuitions about ‘inconsistent multiplicities’
[i.e. proper classes]”.
6Indeed Parsons refers to proper classes as ‘attributes’ at certain points (see [Parsons, 1983b],
p304). He also explored the idea that proper classes do not obey [EXT] but rather the following
principle he calls ‘intensionality’:
(∀z)(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y
As I think it fairly clear that proper classes are not properties I will not consider this further here.
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We therefore require a different way of spelling out what is meant by saying that
proper classes are intensional. Further, any characterisation should make sense of the
definite membership of proper classes. I will now examine two ways one might make
this claim more precise; the Modal Function View and the Projection View.
3.2 Proper Classes as Modal Functions.
3.2.1 The Modal Function View Explained.
We require a way of making the claim that proper classes are intensional more precise.
In possible world semantics, intensions are represented as functions from possible
worlds w to subclasses of the domains of the w. Maybe then we can transform this
semantic claim into a metaphysical one.
First, however, we must make sense of what is meant by ‘possible world’. We
might think of possible worlds as way the Cumulative Hierarchy might have been.
Each of these universes has different contents7. If we examine (B) we see that Parsons
suggests that a proper class (in some universe) might have had different elements. Let
‘V’ represent an arbitrary universe of Set Theory. One could hold the following view
about proper classes:
[Proper Classes as Modal Functions]
(1) For any condition φ there is a function fφ from all universes such that
for any universe V, fφ(V) = the class of all φs in V.
(2) The class of φs is a proper class iff there are distinct universes V′ and
V′′ such that fφ(V′) 6= fφ(V′′) (i.e. there are two universes where φ has
different elements.)
(3) If the class of φs is a proper class, then the class of φs is the function
fφ.
7A natural way to explain this notion further would be through an examination of (C). There
Reinhardt argued that if there were more ordinals a proper class would have different members.
Under the Iterative Conception there is a stage Vα for every ordinal α. Therefore, if there had been
more ordinals, there would have been more Vα and hence the universe would have been larger. As
I do want want to commit to these universes being extensions of one another I will not assume that
this is the case for this view.
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3.2.2 Evaluation of the Modal Function View.
I will argue that the Modal Function View is problematic for the reason that it raises
more problems than it answers. However, let us first note some positive features of
the view.
3.2.2.1 Initial Positive Remarks.
The Modal Function View has some points to its credit. It is precise in that it
identifies [COMP] as the guilty principle when only about sets. For [COMP] implies
that proper classes are in fact objects. This is not the case, proper classes turn out
to be functions from different universes of Set Theory to subclasses of those worlds.
Thus (as proper classes are functions from worlds rather than objects in those worlds)
they may not be substituted for an object variable in the paradoxical reasoning.
For this reason a diagnosis is also given for why we fell into error. It is not appar-
ent, when we examine Set Theory, why there should be different possible universes of
sets, or indeed why certain classes are functions from those universes to subclasses of
their domains rather than sets.
3.2.2.2 Why the Modal Function View Fails.
The Modal Function View is unsatisfying as a philosophical standpoint. As stated,
it does not actually provide us with a characterisation of the things for which we
are seeking explanation. We want to know what the φs that do not form a set at
this world are. These are the proper classes in which we are interested; the actual
proper classes. But it is simply a fact that these are not functions from universes to
subclasses of universes.
This worry can be made more precise as follows. Let the actual world be denoted
by V . Let φ be some condition such that there is no set of all φ in V . We want to
know what the class of actual φs is, namely fφ(V ). It is this that is the proper class,
not fφ as a whole.
The modal function theorist can, however, modify their view to accommodate this
problem by dropping (3) in their view (the proposition that a proper class is the entire
function) and modifying (2). Their view would then read as follows:
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[Proper Classes as Modal Functions]′
(1) For any condition φ there is a function fφ from all universes such that
for any universe V, fφ(V) = the class of all φs in V.
(2) The class of φs, namely fφ(V ), is a proper class iff there is some V
distinct from V such that fφ(V) 6= fφ(V ) (i.e. there is some universe
distinct from V where φ has different elements.)
This modification would certainly avoid the above complaint. It attempts to
provide a characterisation of the objects we are interested in, namely the φs in the
Cumulative Hierarchy.
However, the view is still unsatisfactory. For it seems that there are insurmount-
able problems for a view that posits the existence of these functions. Take any fφ
used in the explanation of proper classes. It is clear that every V is a member of the
domain of fφ (to be denoted by ‘dom(fφ)’). Now we can see that dom(fφ) cannot be
in any V. To see this, assume that dom(fφ) is in some V. Then it is the case that
dom(fφ) is a member of V is a member of dom(fφ). Thus V is a non-well-founded
universe of sets. But then, as every universe of sets is (on the Iterative Conception)
well-founded, V is not a universe of Set Theory at all. Thus the domain of fφ does
not exist in any V. But then fφ does not exist in any V; fφ requires its domain to
exist in order for it to exist. This result is paradoxical; how could anything (especially
something doing significant explanatory work) not exist in any universe8?
It seems then, that the Modal Function View is unsatisfactory. An attempt to
identify proper classes with functions does not give us a characterisation of the objects
for which we required an explanation. While the view can be modified to avoid this
problem, it turns out that the functions to which the view appeals are themselves
paradoxical9.
8Indeed, there is substantial pressure to think that a function should exist in the actual universe.
For, in what sense is the statement “For any condition φ there is a function fφ from all universes
such that for any universe V, fφ(V) = the class of all φs in V” true if the function in question does
not exist at the actual universe?
9Parsons was well aware of the fact that such an explanation of proper classes was unsatisfactory.
See, for example, the following passage from [Parsons, 1977] ”It seems that we cannot consider a
proper class as given by an intension that is definite in the sense of, say, possible world semantics
as a function from possible worlds to extensions.” (p290).
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3.3 The Projection View.
3.3.1 The Projection View Explained.
So, proper classes cannot be ‘intensional’ in the sense of functions from possible
universes to subclasses of the domains of those worlds. Indeed we do not need to talk
about functions in order to understand the central claims of (B) and (C). The point
there is that proper classes are able to change members dependent on what ordinals
exist. This might lead us to the following view:
[The Projection View] What makes the class of all φs a proper class (rather
than a set) is that for some non-actual universe V, the class of φs in V
is different from the class of φs in V . One class has members the other
lacks.
How would this work? An understanding of what is meant can be arrived at from
examining the model theory of Set Theory. A model can be thought of as a domain
of objects, the functions that exist on the domain, and the relations that hold on the
objects within the model. Let us examine some models and observe a phenomenon
about what happens when some objects within a model do not form a set within that
model.
For example take the model Hω0 . This model has as its domain the hereditarily
finite sets, where a set is hereditarily finite iff it is either the empty set or a finite
set {a1, a2, ..., ak}, where a1, ..., ak are all hereditarily finite. The only relation on the
model is the standard interpretation of ‘∈’. Now, consider the property of being a
von Neumann ordinal number. Present in this structure are the von Neumann rep-
resentations of all the finite ordinals. Thus, we may identify what objects constitute
‘the ordinal numbers’ in this model. As the model only includes the hereditarily finite
sets, it does not include the set of all finite ordinals. In fact the negation of the axiom
of infinity is satisfied on this model10. Thus, from the viewpoint of the model, the
ordinal number of ω0 is a proper class. Now consider the model Hω1 . This is the set
10It may be objected here that for this reason Hω0 does not satisfy full ZFC, and hence does
not satisfy the Iterative Conception. Thus it is not a possible world of Set Theory. While this is
true, Hω0 is still a structure that provides a nice analogy with what the Projection theorist argues
happens in the case of the actual Cumulative Hierarchy.
60
of hereditarily countable sets, where a set is hereditarily countable iff it is a countable
set of hereditarily countable sets. On this model the ordinal number of ω0 will be
a set. However, the ordinal number of ω1 will not be a set, but will appear to be
a proper class ‘from the perspective of the model’. Again, if we consider different
models, ‘the ordinal numbers’ will be different. Indeed, if we consider models that
extend one another, at each successive expansion of a model what appeared to be the
proper class of all ordinal numbers will be a set at the next model. The condition ‘x
is a von Neumann ordinal number’, however, is consistent across the models.
Maybe then the Cumulative Hierarchy bears a similar relation to the non-actual
Vs as a model bears to an extension of that model. Thus the objects that satisfy the
condition ‘x is an ordinal number’ can be different depending on what ordinals exist.
The actual Cumulative Hierarchy contains all ordinal numbers of actual ordinals. If
there had been more ordinals, however, there would have been more ordinal num-
bers at stages beyond those contained in the actual Cumulative Hierarchy. Thus, in
projected universes the ordinal numbers would have more members.
Moreover, the objects that constitute the ordinal numbers in the actual Cumula-
tive Hierarchy would form a possible set in an extended hierarchy. Given that every
ordinal number is formed at some Vα of the Cumulative Hierarchy, if there are Vβ ,
β > α then these objects will constitute a set at some successor stage Vβ . There are
just such Vβ in some of the Vs.
We should be careful, here, however. For all I have said, it is not necessarily the
case for two distinct universes V′ and V′′ that either V′′ extends V′ or vice versa11.
The core idea is that for paradoxical conditions φ, the satisfiers of φ can be different
objects depending on what ordinals there are (and hence what is contained within
the hierarchy).
3.3.2 Evaluation of the Projection View.
I think, however, that this view of proper classes is problematic. It is especially
clear that the view is wholly untenable for a Monist Realist. Nonetheless, let us first
11It should be noted, however, that implicit in both [Parsons, 1974b] and [Reinhardt, 1974] is a
view on which possible universes are indeed extensions of one another.
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examine some positive features of the account.
3.3.2.1 Initial Positive Remarks.
The Projection View is precise in identifying [COMP] as the erroneous principle and
attempts to motivate this choice of error. Sets and proper classes are very different
kinds of thing on the Projection View; the condition which defines a proper class
might have had different satisfiers. Hence [COMP] is unsatisfactory; proper classes
are very different objects and proper class variables should not be substitutable for
set variables in our reasoning.
In this way a diagnosis is also provided. For there is a sense in which the φs in V
might constitute a set. This is because in some of the V there is a possible set with
just those objects as members. It so happens that the Cumulative Hierarchy has the
length it actually has, and so these things do not constitute a set. All it took, however,
was for there to be enough ordinals, and then the class in question would have been
a set. Since we do not know exactly what ordinals exist, it is understandable that we
might get the length of iteration wrong, and think that a possible set is an actual set.
The solution also avoids overkill. Firstly, although [COMP] is shown to be faulty,
one can preserve the intuition of plausibility of [COMP] without inconsistency. We
can replace [COMP] with a similar modal principle:
[COMP♦] ♦(∃x)(∀y)[y ∈ x↔ φ(y)]
Such an axiom states that for any condition φ evaluated at world V, there is a
possible world at which all the φs (in V) are collected into a set.
Further, in this way the projection theorist is able to incorporate much talk about
large cardinals as talk about possible objects. For example, by considering counterfac-
tual projections of the actual universe of sets, the objects that constitute the ordinal
numbers of all actual ordinals in a larger universe form a set that is a measurable
cardinal ([Parsons, 1977], p288)12.
12This is true given some assumptions about the actual universe. See [Reinhardt, 1974] for full
technical details.
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3.3.2.2 Why the Projection View is Unsatisfactory.
Despite these considerations the Projection View is highly problematic for a Monist
Realist. This is because it is impossible for the Monist Realist to make sense of the
modality in play.
In giving an exposition of the modality, it was said that if there were more ordinals
proper classes would have more members. But what is the content of the phrase “if
there were more ordinals”? What modality is in play here?
Clearly, it is implausible to view the modality as either physical or metaphysical;
mathematics is invariant over such possibilities. One might try to argue that meta-
physical modality does in fact have a part to play; one might say that it is a contingent
matter what urelemente exist. This is no response. The pure sets will be the same in
universes with different urelemente (as they are all constructed from the empty set).
Thus, allowing what the urelemente are to be a contingent matter will have no effect
on what pure sets exist. As noted in Chapter 1, the paradoxes that I am considering
are ones reproducible in the pure sets. Further, as the projection theorist requires
there be more ordinals at different worlds, there must be additional pure sets in those
worlds representing those possible ordinals. Therefore, the modality cannot be either
physical or metaphysical.
Given that the modality in question is not clearly a familiar notion such as phys-
ical or metaphysical modality, the projection theorist is still faced with the task of
explaining to what their notion of modality responds. It is not philosophically satis-
factory to appeal to a technical notion without some account of what that technical
notion formalises.
One might try to elucidate the modality in terms of supposition. We might say
that the content of the statement that there could have been more ordinals should
be understood as the statement that we can suppose that more ordinals exist (even
if they do not). This seems to be a phenomenon that appears in some other areas
of mathematics. For example, consider the introduction of i as a solution to the
equation x2 = −1. Now, one might think that i nonetheless does not exist. It is not
an actual mathematical object, but rather produces a nice formal theory with some
interesting uses. Further, expansion can give us plausible results about the ‘actual’
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structure we are considering; the real numbers. As the real numbers are embedded in
the complex numbers, universal theorems about the complex numbers restricted to
the reals and with no imaginary part are theorems about real numbers. Maybe this
is how to understand the modality; we suppose there are more ordinals, and see what
conclusions we can draw from this fact. As V is part of all V that are extensions of
V we can learn about V from studying the V even though they do not exist.
There is, however, a substantial disanalogy between the ‘supposition’ in the com-
plex numbers and in the possible sets. In the case of the complex numbers, we have
an explanation of our reasoning concerning complex numbers through understanding
complex arithmetic and analysis as based on a plane rather than a line. The reals
then are just one line within this plane. In this way our original supposition is shown
to have an intelligible interpretation. This is precisely what has not yet been given
for the Projection View. Merely stating that we can suppose that there are more
ordinals is not enough, we must understand to what this supposition amounts.
Providing such an interpretation will be an impossible task for the Monist Realist.
The universe exists and is ‘finished’. It describes all the sets there are, and could ever
be (for a given initial starting set of urelemente). It is a principle of Monist Realism
that the universe cannot be extended in any way. To say ‘there could have been more
ordinals’ is false; if there were more ordinals, there would be more Vα indexed by
those ordinals, and so we would have extended the Cumulative Hierarchy.
Maybe then the projection theorist, rather than saying that there could have been
more ordinals (and hence extensions of the Cumulative Hierarchy), should say that
there could be universes smaller than the actual Cumulative Hierarchy. Using this,
they could still explain the non-rigidity of proper class membership by arguing that
in a universe containing less, proper classes would have different members.
I see three ways that we might explicate the idea of ‘smaller’ universes.
1. A smaller universe is a Vλ for some limit ordinal λ that, together with ∈ inter-
preted as membership restricted to Vλ, is a model of Set Theory.
2. A smaller universe is a model of Set Theory with a domain that contains all
the ordinals, but which is narrower than the universe, with ∈ interpreted as
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membership restricted to that domain (An example of this sort would be the
Constructible Hierarchy ‘L’13).
3. A smaller universe is a model with both the above two properties (i.e. A model
of Set Theory that has as its domain a proper subset of some Vλ for limit λ with
∈ interpreted as membership restricted to that domain).
However, none of these suggestions is going to work with the Projection View.
For, given any of the above three characterisations, objects that are uncontroversially
sets will turn out to be proper classes.
Let us first consider the cases of both (1) and (3). Take some Vλ as the domain
of the sub-universe in question. Let κ be the successor of λ. Now consider the class
of all ordinal numbers of ordinals less than κ. This will contain the ordinal number
of λ (as λ < κ). However, the class of ordinal numbers of ordinals less than κ in Vλ
does not contain the ordinal number of λ (as rep(λ) is not yet formed at Vλ). Hence,
if the Projection View is correct and we use either (1) or (3), the class of ordinals less
than κ is a proper class. This is false, it is clearly a set.
In the case of (2), let us consider the class of sets of natural numbers. Suppose that
(as many believe) that not every set of natural numbers is constructible. Therefore,
the class of natural numbers has members in V that it lacks in L. Thus, under the
Projection View using (3), the class of sets of natural numbers is a proper class.
Again, however, this class is uncontroversially a set.
Thus the Projection View fails. It quite simply cannot give an account of the
modality central to its exposition under Monist Realism.
3.4 Conclusions.
There is a thought that we might be able to characterise proper classes using modal
resources. However, using functions from possible worlds to subclasses of domains is
unsatisfactory; the functions are themselves paradoxical. Instead we might explain
13L is a sub-universe of the Cumulative Hierarchy where, instead of including all subsets of Vα
as sets at Vα+1, we instead only include sets that are first-order definable by a formula that only
contains parameters from the previous stages and has its quantifiers restricted to those stages.
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proper classes as defined by conditions that change satisfiers in different possible uni-
verses. However, it was seen that there is no satisfactory way to understand the notion
of ‘possible world’ used. For this reason, the Modal Views that I have considered are
not a satisfactory characterisation of proper classes for a Monist Realist.
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Chapter 4
The Plural Account of Proper
Classes.
In this chapter I examine the view that proper classes are merely ‘some things’. Proper
classes do not exist. Instead reference to proper classes is loose talk and should be
understood via plural reference to some objects. My strategy is as follows:
• In 4.1 I outline the Plural Account.
• In 4.2 I give an evaluation of the view and defend it against some objections:
– 4.2.1-I discuss some positive aspects of the account.
– 4.2.2-I reject an objection to the plural theorist that plural reference cannot
capture the whole of class theory.
– 4.2.3-I discuss and argue against Linnebo’s criticism that there is a collapse
of pluralities to sets.
– 4.2.4-I develop an objection to the Plural Account based on superplural
quantification. I argue that it is a challenge that can be overcome.
• In 4.3 I conclude that the plural account is a satisfactory account for the Monist
Realist.
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4.1 What is the Plural Account?
We saw in Chapter 2 that the heavyweight theorist was unable to give an account
of why proper classes are not sets. The best explanation for this fact ([OHH]) could
not be appealed to for the reason that proper classes, as precise objects, were the sort
of things that should be members of other kinds of class (hyper-classes). This, we
saw, resulted in further problems being developed for these α-hyper-class hierarchies.
In the last Chapter, we examined some weakenings of the Heavyweight View. On
these views proper classes were not objects, but rather were explained using modal
resources. However, these were also seen to be unsatisfactory. It seems then that
we require a way of referring to many things at once that does not presuppose the
objecthood of a collection distinct from the elements, but also does not make use of
the modality of the previous Chapter. Do we have such a notion?
4.1.1 Plural Reference.
Indeed it does seem that we have a way of referring to many things without pre-
supposing the existence of a collection as an object distinct from the things. Such a
notion is the notion of plural reference.
If one examines natural language, it appears that we are able to refer to more than
one object at once using a single referring term. For example if I say “The smarties
in this bag are green.” I appear to be making reference to precisely the smarties in
the bag (of which there are more than one1). Such a phenomenon I will call plural
reference. Plural reference is most easily seen with the use of words like ‘some’, ‘most’
and combinations of names (as in ‘Russell and Whitehead’)2.
Now, for many examples of plural reference one may give an equivalent sentence
in singular terms. For example, the smarties example above one might paraphrase in
the following way (with quantification restricted to the contents of the bag):
∀(x)[Smartie(x)→ Green(x)]
1It should be noted that this sentence does admit of a first-order paraphrase. This is simply an
introductory example to show that pre-theoretically one might think that there is a device that is
present in natural language that allows us to refer plurally.
2There are other examples suggested in the literature, for example music groups. See
[Uzquiano, 2011] for a review.
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Such a statement simply says that anything that is a smartie is green, and makes
no mention of plural reference. One might be tempted to think then that we can deal
with all apparent occurrences of plural reference in a singular (and hence first-order)
manner. One could simply use singular reference to refer to urelemente and sets, and
when one needs to refer to many things use the relevant set and membership relation
to do the work of plural reference. It seems, however, that plural reference cannot be
fully captured by singular reference.
There are a number of reasons why one might think this. For starters, one might
think that it is simply intuitive that we are able to refer to more than one thing
without referring to anything over and above those things. We often refer to more
than one object with a single phrase, with the set of those things seeming to play no
role. As Boolos remarked “It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios
you are eating a set” ([Boolos, 1984], p448). Statements made about some objects
seem to be about the objects in question, not any set of them.
We should not be content with mere intuition, however. Thankfully, there are
other cases that are more convincing. For example, if I say “Matthew, Steve, James,
and Tim carried the boat to the pontoon.” I am not saying anything about the set
of Matthew, Steve, James and Tim. It is also true that no individual one of them
carried the boat to the pontoon; they carried it together. Further, the claim that
“Matthew, Steve, James, and Tim carried the boat to the pontoon.” does not admit
of an obvious paraphrase using quantification or conjunction. The sentence “Each of
Matthew, Steve, James and Tim carried the boat down to the pontoon.” should be
subject to quantifier elimination and so it should be true that Matthew carried the
boat to the pontoon. This, taken literally, is false; he helped to carry the boat to
the pontoon, but did not (by himself) carry it to the pontoon. Similarly if we take
the conjunction “Matthew carried the boat down to the pontoon and Steve carried
the boat down to the pontoon and....” it should be true that each of the conjuncts is
true. For exactly the same reason, this is false.
Further, there are some legitimate, grammatical sentences of English that do not
admit of a first-order paraphrase. The most famous example is probably the Geach-
Kaplan sentence:
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(GK) Some critics admire only one another.
Such a sentence was shown by David Kaplan to be non-first-orderisable. While
the legitimacy of this statement can disputed3, it is nonetheless easy to generate other
statements that do not admit of a first-order paraphrase. A selection of these were
reviewed by Boolos in his seminal paper “To Be is to be the Value of a Variable (or
to be Some Values of Some Variables)” [Boolos, 1984]. For example:
(G) There are some gunslingers each of whom has shot the right foot of
at least one of the others.
Is most naturally formalised in second order logic as:
(Gi) (∃X)((∃x)X(x)∧ (∀x)[X(x)→ (∃y)(X(y)∧ (y 6= x∧ ShotRF(xy)))])
If we were to substitute ‘x = y+1’ for ‘ShotRF(xy)’ we get a sentence that is true in
all nonstandard models of arithmetic, but not in the standard model ([Boolos, 1984],
p435)4.
While (Gi) is formulated in second order logic, this should not detract from the
plural nature of the natural language sentence (G). Second order logic was merely
used to show its non-first-orderisability. Further, Boolos showed that it is possible to
give an interpretation of monadic second-order logic in plural logic. This work has
been extended by Hewitt to a plural interpretation of full second-order logic5.
I take the above examples to show that plural reference is a feature of thought.
Further, it is accompanied by a precise formal logic, which makes its use appropriate
within Set Theory. While a full defence of plural logic is pertinent, my focus is to
see whether or not Set Theory can make use of these plural resources. Therefore,
from this point on, I shall assume plural reference and its logic. How then might we
use plural reference within Set Theory? How could plural reference contribute to an
understanding of ‘proper class’ talk?
3This is a fact that Boolos acknowledged in [Boolos, 1984].
4To see why, observe that a nonstandard model permits infinite descending successor chains. The
above sentence implies that there is some non-empty X such that if X(x) then X(x − 1). This is
false on the standard model, as if X(0) then X(0 − 1) which is false; there is no predecessor of 0.
However, in a non-standard model there can be infinite descending successor chains, and so if X(x)
holds of a non-standard number with infinitely many predecessors the sentence can be made true.
5See [Hewitt, 2012].
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4.1.2 Use within Set Theory.
Plural reference comes complete with its own precise logic where we standardly use
double lower-case letters (such as ‘xx’) as variables for plural terms and ‘x ≺ xx’ to
mean ‘x is one of the xx’. Often, a variable ‘xx’ is referred to as ‘a plurality’. Such
locutions should be regarded as loose talk. The use of a plural reference term does
not presuppose the existence of a collection as an object over and above the objects
referred to by use of the plural term. Such talk is acceptable only when it is shorthand
for a paraphrase in only plural terms (and even then is misleading). I will try and
avoid lapses into such ‘singularism’ where possible, and flag that I am using a singular
term in a loose fashion where a plural paraphrase would be particularly clumsy.
The fact that plural reference does not presuppose the existence of a collection over
and above the objects to which one refers suggests a way out of the paradoxes. We
have seen in previous chapters that part of the problem with viewing proper classes
as abstract objects is that it is not clear why such collections would not be sets. If we
instead view proper classes not as set-like collections, but artefacts of plural reference
to sets, the paradoxes would dissolve.
We then have a system where the inconsistent [COMP] is replaced by a similar
principle about plural reference:
[P-COMP] (∃x)φ(x)→ (∃xx)(∀y)[y ≺ xx↔ φ(y)]6
This states that for any (nonempty) condition φ there are some things that sat-
isfy φ. [P-COMP] (at least in some form7) certainly has intuitive pull, if we have a
condition such that it is definite for any object whether or not it satisfies that con-
dition, then it seems that there are some things that satisfy that condition. Further,
[P-COMP] allows us to talk about proper classes without having them be objects.
Let us now examine how the paradoxes are avoided.
6It is noticeable that this differs from the set-theoretic comprehension axiom in that it has an
antecedent stating that there is something that satisfies φ. This is because plural logic does not
(normally) admit an empty plurality, a fact which will be discussed later. It should also be noted
here that I assume a single object does constitute ‘some things’. To see this, consider the sentence
“The students who take this course will benefit from it.”. Here ‘the students’ is a plural reference
term, but the sentence is true if just one student takes the course and benefits from it.
7There are those who think that it is not correct in its full generality. See, for example,
[Linnebo, 2010].
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Reference to the Russell class should be understood as plural reference to all
the non-self-membered objects. If I say ‘the Russell class exists’, what I should be
understood as saying is that ‘there are some things such that they are not members
of themselves’. This is clearly true for a Monist Realist on the Iterative Conception.
The Russell paradox would be avoided, as substitution of R for x in
‘(∀x)(x ∈ R↔ x 6∈ x)’ would be illegitimate. R is merely a plural term, as this is not
a singular referring term it cannot be substituted for a singular variable.
Similarly reference to the Universal class should be understood as plural reference
to all the sets. The statement of the existence of the Universal class should be
understood as a statement that ‘there are some sets that are self-identical’. Again,
if Monist Realism is true this seems obvious. The paradox is avoided, as we cannot
talk about the power-set of some sets. There is no singular set to which the Power
Set operation can be applied8.
The Burali-Forti paradox is also given an account. Reference to the proper class
of all ordinal numbers should be understood merely as reference to the well-ordered
von Neumann ordinal numbers. However, assuming that if we have some things we
can apply ordering techniques to them, the von Neumann ordinal numbers can be
well-ordered by the membership relation. They are collectively transitive and well
ordered in the sense that (a) For any transitive well-ordered sets x, y, Trichotomy
holds for the relation ∈, (b) the ∈ relation is transitive for any sets within the von
Neumann ordinal numbers, (c) if there are some transitive well-ordered sets there will
be an ∈-least set, and (d) if x is a transitive well-ordered set that is one of the ordinal
numbers then every member of x is a transitive well ordered set. Thus these things
do have an order-type; there is a certain structure placed on them by the membership
relation.
It seems then that in order to prevent paradox we must deny that there is a
representation (i.e. ordinal number) that corresponds to the order-type that the
ordinals exemplify collectively. Should this bother us? I do not think it should. I
see no good reason to accept that the von Neumann representation of ordinals should
provide anything other than a partial representation of order-type.
8One can, however, modify this Cantorian argument slightly. This reformulation of the problem
will be considered in 4.2.4.
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The situation is parallelled with respect to cardinality and proper classes. In 2.2.3
it was noted that proper classes may always be mapped one-to-one. Thus [LSHF ] was
seen to be a true principle about proper classes. Thus proper classes have ‘cardinality’
of a sort. Strictly speaking, however, proper classes do not exist and ‘transcend’
cardinality. It is true, nonetheless, that if we have some things that do not form a
set then they may be mapped one-to-one with some other things that do not form
a set. However, it is uncontroversial in this case that there is no set taken as the
canonical representation of this ‘cardinality’. This is the same with order-type; there
are cases where some things may exhibit an order-type, but nonetheless there is no
representation of this order-type.
4.2 Evaluation of the Plural Account.
4.2.1 Positive Remarks about the Plural Account.
The Plural Account has a number of good features. Firstly, it is precise and provides
diagnosis. [COMP] is satisfactory when used to prove the existence of some things
all of which satisfy a condition, but its use is fallacious if used to prove the existence
of a set of those things. It is not clear, before we realise that there are cases where
for some things xx there is no set of the xx, why proper classes are not sets. The
success of the use of Set Theory to represent other cases of plural reference (such as
reference to ‘the natural numbers’, or ‘the real numbers’) leads us to think that for
any case of plural reference there is a corresponding set. This turns out to be false.
The motivation for such a response is also clear. As shown in the previous section,
plural reference is a well-established feature of natural language with a precise formal
analysis. It is another way to talk about many things collectively other than by
referring in a singular manner to the set of those things. We can see this with respect
to the puzzle of Chapter 1. There it was noted that we lacked an explanation of the
fact that it is definite for any object x within the Cumulative Hierarchy whether or
not x satisfies a particular paradoxical condition. Therefore, there seem to be some
objects such that each definitely satisfies the condition. This talk of “some objects”
is quite naturally understood in plural terms.
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The Plural Account also fares very well with respect to overkill. Firstly, it pre-
serves the thought that [COMP] has some intuitive plausibility. As noted above, for
any condition φ there are some objects within the Cumulative Hierarchy that each
satisfy φ.
Further, the plural response is able to account for our talk of large cardinals. We
can ground our talk of embeddings by referring plurally to some ordered pairs, even
if there is no set of those pairs9.
We are also able to make true statements concerning proper classes. If I wish to say
that the Russell class and Universal class are the same class, without problematically
committing myself to the objecthood of the paradoxical classes, I can do so by stating
that anything that is one of the non-self-membered things is also one of the sets.
It seems then that the plural response is in a fairly strong position. It is, however,
not without its dissenters. I will now examine some objections one might raise against
the Plural Account. All, I shall argue, are answerable.
4.2.2 The Empty Set.
One might argue the following. After discovering the paradoxes, we think that our
class-theoretical discourse extends our talk of sets. There are some classes that are
not sets, but all sets are classes. This is a fact that an account of classes should
incorporate. If one thinks that our class talk is characterised by plural reference,
then for any class there are some things that are in that class. This is not the case,
however, there is one very important set (and hence class) for which there are not
some things that are its members; namely ∅. There is no empty plurality; ‘plurality’
is merely loose talk to refer to some things, and in the case of the members of ∅ there
are no things to which we may refer. As there is no ‘empty plurality’ to correspond
to the empty set, plural talk is not a satisfactory way of interpreting class talk; it
cannot account for all classes.
I regard this as no objection. The reason we originally got into trouble with
the class paradoxes was because imprecision in the notion of class resulted in us
9A fuller exposition of the relationship between plural quantification over sets and large cardinal
hypotheses is available in [Uzquiano, 2003].
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equivocating between plural reference to sets and singular reference to a set of sets.
The term, ‘class’ can be understood as talk that may be characterised as singular
reference to a set or plural reference to some sets. All that is required for it to be
legitimate to use the term ‘class’ is definite membership. In some cases ‘class’ can
be understood in either plural terms or singular terms (such as when I refer to the
class of all natural numbers). Other times reference must be understood plurally
(such as when one (misleadingly) refers to the ‘class’ of ordinal numbers). And at
other times, reference to a class must be understood only through singular reference
(such as when I refer to the empty class). This account would actually explain rather
nicely a pedagogical phenomenon; the baﬄement of many students at the notion of
the empty set. Such baﬄement can be understood as conflation of the notions of ‘set’
and ‘plurality’ due to pre-theoretic contact with both notions through reference to
many objects.
4.2.3 Collapse.
One might want to contend instead, that pluralities do in fact always have a corre-
sponding heavyweight object. One could do this by arguing that the semantics for
plurals nearly always rely on set-theoretic resources. Often, plurals are analysed in
our semantics as sets, so why should we not think that they just are sets?
This is a very weak objection. Just because our formal semantics nearly al-
ways uses sets does not mean that the objects in question are sets. Benacerraf
showed as much for natural numbers in his seminal ‘What numbers could not be’
[Benacerraf, 1965]. Our formal semantics may simply be inadequate, and only a par-
tial articulation. Alternatively, it might be a notational systematisation, useful for
formalising our plural talk but merely a heuristic with no ontological import. Either
way, there are many things that we analyse in our semantics as sets, that are not
actually sets.
However, there is a stronger argument that some things always have a correspond-
ing heavyweight object. The argument proceeds via an appeal to Extensionality as
definitional of set. The Axiom of Extensionality may be stated as follows:
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[EXT] (∀x)(∀y)[x = y ↔ (∀z)(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)]
This states that two sets x and y are identical iff they have exactly the same
members. It is then argued that it is sufficient for some things to be a set that they
have definite membership and satisfy an extensionality axiom. As has been noted,
proper classes on the Plural Account have definite membership (it is definite, for any
object x whether or not it is one of some things that do not form a set). Now, there
is no identity relation for some things (some things, after all, are not an object and
hence cannot be identical to anything). However, there is a sameness relation between
some things xx and some things yy. Let this relation be denoted by ‘≡’. It seems
clear that we should take as an axiom the principle that some things xx are the same
things as some things yy iff every thing that is one of the xx is one of the yy. This
is an extensionality axiom of sorts for our logic of plurals, and may be formalised as
follows:
[P-EXT] (∀xx)(∀yy)[xx ≡ yy ↔ (∀z)(z ≺ xx↔ z ≺ yy)]
Thus as the logic of plurals contains an axiom of extensionality and for some things
xx it is definite for any object x whether or not x ≺ xx; every plurality is a set. The
argument is nicely summed up by by Linnebo as follows.
“The semantics of plural logic ensures that a plurality consists of a de-
terminate range of objects. But a set is completely characterized by its
elements. A plurality thus provides the resources for a complete and pre-
cise characterization of a set. So what could prevent us from collecting
the given plurality into a set?” ([Linnebo, 2010], p149)
The thought is the following. Sets are completely characterised by their elements.
This is what is meant by Extensionality, the core notion of set. When we refer to
some things, it is a definite whether or not an object is one of those things. Therefore,
if we simply substitute ‘is a member of y’ for ‘is one of the xx’ , we have a complete
characterisation of the membership relation of a set. Hence some things must always
form a set. The principle that some things always form a set I shall call (following
Linnebo) [COLLAPSE]. One can formalise [COLLAPSE] as follows:
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[COLLAPSE] (∀xx)(∃y)(∀x)(x ≺ xx↔ x ∈ y)10
It is obvious that [COLLAPSE] combined with [P-COMP] is inconsistent (Just
use x 6∈ x for φ in [P-COMP] then use [COLLAPSE] to get the Russell set). Linnebo
suggests that we reject [P-COMP]11, and hence that reference to proper classes should
be characterised as plural reference to sets12.
The challenge is a serious one. For [COLLAPSE] appears to be plausible. To
begin with, it seems pre-theoretically intuitive; sets are definite collections of objects,
and for any things xx it is definite whether or not some object x is one of the xx. Why
should all xx not then have a corresponding set? Further, [COLLAPSE] is motivated
by one of the core principles of Set Theory; sets depend for their identity on their
members. If there is a fact of the matter for any object x whether or not it is one of
the xx, it looks like it should be easy to characterise the membership relation for a
set.
Further, [COLLAPSE] seems to be a principle at play in our conception of the
original definition of the Cumulative Hierarchy. A guiding principle there was that at
each Vα+1 we formed sets of every subclass of Vα. Whenever we have some things at
a Vα that are not all members of some set at Vα, then the set of those things will be
first formed at Vα+1. This ‘process’ responds to the same intuition as [COLLAPSE];
if we have some things at some Vα, their set is formed at Vα+1.
It seems then that the plural theorist must provide compelling reasons why it is
not the case that some things always form a set.
Linnebo argues that anyone who rejects [COLLAPSE] must accept [LSH] as their
explanation for why it is not the case that some things always form a set. If true, this
would be devastating for the plural theorist; I argued earlier [LSH] cannot explain
why for some things there is not always a set of those things.
Linnebo argues from two principles. The first is a plural version of Replacement
that states that if there is a function that maps some things xx onto some things yy,
and xx form a set, then yy too form a set.
10My formulation differs very slightly from Linnebo’s (he abbreviates the formal statement of some
things forming a set). It is easy to see the two formulations are equivalent.
11Though he still preserves a modified version of [P-COMP]. See [Linnebo, 2010].
12It would also seem that in order to accept this, Linnebo rejects Monist Realism.
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The second is the principle of Cardinal Comparability [CC] which states that for
any two pluralities xx and yy either the xx are fewer than the yy or the xx are at
least as many as the yy. Linnebo uses these two principles to reach the conclusion13
that the plural theorist who wishes to deny [COLLAPSE] must accept:
[P-LSH] Some things form a set iff they are fewer than the ordinals.
Thus the plural theorist is committed to [LSH] and hence their position must be
false.
Is this the case? The plural theorist should accept both premises. Further they
should accept [P-LSH]14. This is, however, not a reductio of their position.
Earlier, I remarked that [LSH] is true insofar as it is true that if there is a one-to-
one mapping between a class A and the ordinal numbers then A is not a set. I argued,
however, that it was not a satisfactory explanation for why A is not a set. One can
have a correct method for determining when someone has got the wrong answer for
the differential of a function in that the result fails to predict the correct value for
the gradient of the tangent at a point. This is not an explanation that responds to
the structure at play, and the notion of taking the limit of a function as it approaches
a point. I submit that the plural theorist can accept [P-LSH], but merely as a true
principle about when some things form a set, rather than an explanation for why
they do not form a set.
One can object to Linnebo as follows. We should attend to the following part of
Linnebo’s argument:
“A plurality thus provides the resources for a complete and precise char-
acterization of a set. So what could prevent us from collecting the given
plurality into a set?” ([Linnebo, 2010], p149)
It is true that a ‘plurality’ (to use Linnebo’s term) provides the resources for a
complete and precise characterisation of a set in the following sense. If we have a
non-empty set, there will be some things that are just the things within that set. We
are able to characterise certain sets by plural reference to their elements.
13See the Appendix to [Linnebo, 2010] for the proof.
14Indeed, the most obvious justification for the axiom of Replacement comes from an understanding
of limitation of size, so it is hardly surprising that Replacement should imply [LSH].
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However, it is not the case that for any things xx there is a set of those things.
Why not? What the plural theorist needs is a satisfactory explanation for the fact
that some things do not form sets. As noted in Chapter 2, [OHH] was just such an
explanation. Thus the plural theorist may say the following; some things form a set
just in case at some Vα they are all present. This was considered in the heavyweight
case. It was argued, however, that the heavyweight theorist could not appeal to
[OHH] and fully solve the puzzle of Chapter 1. This was due to the fact that proper
classes were precise objects that thus should be able to be members of classes.
This is not a problem for the plural theorist. Some things are not an object over
and above those things. Those that criticise the Plural Account (such as Linnebo)
would agree with this. Where Linnebo would disagree, however, is that he would
argue that there is always a set that has just those objects as members. At this point,
however, the plural theorist may say that she has very good reason to deny that for
any things there is always a corresponding set of those things; owing to the extendible
condition used in the case of proper classes it is not the case that for any things there
is some Vα containing those things. Thus the plural theorist has good reason to reject
[COLLAPSE].
4.2.4 Superplurals.
A different way one could attempt to develop a puzzle for the plural theorist would
be to appeal to additional resources. One could try to develop a puzzle through
superplural reference. If we think that considerations of natural language are relevant
to questions of reference it seems legitimate to appeal to languages other than English
when trying to determine questions of reference.
Linnebo says the following with respect to Icelandic:
“In Icelandic, for instance, the number words have plural forms which
count, not individual objects, but pluralities of objects that form natural
groups. Here is an example:
‘einn sko´r’ means one shoe
‘einir sko´r’ means one pair of shoes
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‘tvennir sko´r’ means two pairs of shoes” [Linnebo, 2012]
Assuming that when I refer to a pair of shoes I am referring to nothing over and
above the shoes (one right and one left), it seems that we are able (in Icelandic)
not just to count some things, but to count ways in which some things might be
organised. We plurally refer to some things organised in a particular way. This I shall
call superplural reference or 2-plural reference.
Aside from natural organisation on some things (such as pairs of shoes), Linnebo
notes that there appears to be a difference between how some things may be presented.
If we let ‘O’ represent a Cheerio for the moment, eight Cheerios may be presented in
the following way:
OOOOOOOO
However, the same eight Cheerios could also be presented as follows:
OO OO OO OO
There seems to be a substantial difference here. The first is plural reference to
eight Cheerios. The latter is 2-plural reference to eight Cheerios arranged into pairs
of Cheerios. There is no commitment to anything above the eight cheerios other than
“an additional layer of structure” ([Linnebo, 2003], p87).
There are also examples from English, such as the following:
“imagine a video game in which any finite number n of teams can play
against each other in an n-way competition. Then consider the sentences:
(9a) These people and those people play against each other.
(9b) These people, those people and these other people play
against each other.” ([Linnebo and Nicolas, 2008], p193)
In this situation, it seems that the predicate ‘are playing against each other’ is
being satisfied by some people organised into teams. The extra articulation of the
structure (into teams) is relevant, and is not being captured by simple plural reference.
One might question whether the Icelandic and English examples are actually in-
dicative of superplural reference. Hanoch Ben-Yami, for instance, rejects that the
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examples show superplural reference. He then gives his own account of how one may
account for such cases without making use of superplural reference ([Ben-Yami, U]).
While superplural reference certainly is controversial, I take the above examples
to show that it is at least plausible that such a phenomenon exists. Certainly we
require an account of why some things may be arranged in different ways. Further, I
will argue that even if we grant superplural reference (for the sake of argument) this
does not create a problem for the Monist Realist. For these reasons I will assume that
superplural reference is a legitimate form of reference.
If we accept 2-plural reference, it seems we can develop the articulation of structure
further. Consider the eight Cheerios from earlier:
(i) OOOOOOOO
A case of 2-plural reference would be the following:
(ii) OO OO OO OO
However, we can organise the same eight Cheerios as follows:
(iii) OO OO OO OO
If we had sixteen Cheerios, they might be structured in the following manner:
(iv) OO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO
What is happening here? (iii) is plural reference to eight Cheerios arranged as
a pair of pairs of pairs. We seemed to have pushed reference to another level of
structure. Let this be 3-plural reference. (iv) Is plural reference to sixteen Cheerios
arranged as a pair of pairs of pairs of pairs. The level of structure has been given at
another level, hence this is 4-plural reference.
If one accepts that we may push the level if plural reference higher, there seems
to be no barrier to having n-plural reference for all n ∈ N. If we look at the above
examples, we can see that for any case of n-plural reference, we can construct (n+1)-
plural reference by referring plurally to n-plural reference.
Now, consider the following ω long sequence. For the sake of argument let there
be ω many cheerios. Let (n) be shorthand for the contents of the nth row. Let us
examine the following column of Cheerios:
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1st Row. The first 2 Cheerios arranged as follows: OO
2nd Row. The next 22 Cheerios arranged as follows: (1) (1)
3rd Row. The next 23 Cheerios arranged as follows: (2) (2)




n+1st Row. The next 2(n+1) Cheerios following the first 2+22+23+...+2n




This will provide an example of ω-plural reference. Given even more Cheerios, we
could then push reference higher as before to yield (ω + 1)-plural reference. Given
that we can provide an intuitive picture of ω-plural reference, do we have any reason
to suspect that we could not provide a picture of λ-plural reference for any limit
ordinal λ? While I have not given an explicit definition of λ-plural reference the
above picture suggests that one should be available15. Further, substantial technical
advancements have been made in extending superplural reference. n-plural quantifi-
cation is formally equivalent to Simple Type Theory ([Linnebo, 2003], [Hazen, 1997]).
This can then be extended into the transfinite and given a plural interpretation (see
[Linnebo and Rayo, F], Appendix A for a full exposition).
There are two challenges raised by α-plural reference. I shall argue that both can
be answered by the α-plural theorist.
15One suggestion that might be given further consideration is as follows. For limit λ, plural
reference to |λ| things is λ-plural reference iff those things are arranged into parts such that for each
β < λ there is a part so arranged that reference to the things in that part as arranged is β-plural
reference. Many thanks to Marcus Giaquinto for this suggestion.
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4.2.4.1 Preserving our Notion of Collection.
An argument against the α-plural theorist might run as follows. When analysing the
Heavyweight View, it was seen that α-hyper-class structures splintered our notion of
‘collection’ into infinitely many different notions of collection. In the case of α-plural
reference do we have a parallel problem? Each kind of α-plural reference is a different
way of referring to many things. We seem to have ‘set’, ‘1-plural reference’, ‘2-plural
reference’ etc. Is there a problem here?
The α-plural theorist does not split our notion of ‘collection’ into infinitely many
notions. The problem with the Heavyweight View was that each kind of (α + 1)-
hyper-class had to be a different kind of collection-like object from α-hyper-classes.
In the plural case, however, the interpretation is not of different kinds of ‘collection’.
Strictly speaking α-plural reference is not a notion of ‘collection’. It is rather a way
of referring to many things arranged a certain way; there is no ‘collection’ to figure
as an object. That ways of referring should be infinitely many is far more plausible
than the view that we have infinitely many notions of collection.
4.2.4.2 Puzzles for the α-plural Theorist.
A good objection to the α-plural theorist would be to generate puzzles analogous to
the puzzles developed in Chapter 1. The α-plural theorist would then find herself in
a similar position to the heavyweight theorist; unable to account for certain features
within the Cumulative Hierarchy.
It is improbable that it is possible to generate outright contradictions using α-
plural theory. As noted earlier, a theory with n-plural quantification is technically
equivalent to Simple Type Theory16. This in turn can be extended to the trans-
finite case17. The fact that any theory using α-plural reference must respect type
considerations will mean that it is unlikely to be outrightly inconsistent as a result
of the α-plural reference. Despite this fact, we might wonder if the α-plural theorist
faces puzzles in the sense that there are important phenomena for which their theory
cannot account.
16See [Rayo, 2006] for an argument to this effect.
17See [Linnebo and Rayo, F].
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Can we construct such puzzles? Essentially the same methodology as the original
puzzle in Chapter 1 is not available in the context of α-plural reference. This is
because (unlike the Heavyweight View) the α-plural reference to some things is very
different from singular reference to a set. There are no direct analogs of the predicates
‘x is a member of itself’, ‘x is an ordinal number’, and ‘x is a set’ in the α-plural case.
Such predicates do not even apply to α-plural reference; what is denoted by α-plural
reference is not a single object18.
Indeed it is possible to construct a Cantorian style puzzle for the α-plural theorist.
Consider everything, including sets, and forms of α-plural reference etc. There are
fewer of these than cases of α-plural reference to at least one of them (by Cantor’s
Theorem). So there are more cases of α-plural reference to at least one thing than
there are things. But each case of α-plural reference to at least one thing is itself a
thing. Therefore, there are not more cases of referring α-plurally to at least one thing
than there are things. Thus we seem to have contradiction.
There are two ways to respond to the above ‘paradox’. The first is to note that
this ‘paradox’ is informal, it cannot be formulated in the system outlined above as it
contravenes type restrictions. When I say “there are more cases of α-plural reference”,
“each case of α-plural reference” I am quantifying over all types of α-plural reference.
This is not allowed by a system that incorporates type considerations. Nonetheless
it might by argued that this presents an informal puzzle; why should we not be able
to quantify over all levels of α-plural reference? I shall argue that the Monist Realist
can answer this question.
It should first be noted that the Monist Realist may perfectly well accept absolute
generality about sets and objects while denying that we can quantify over all levels of
α-plural reference. As I have argued, α-plural reference is not a kind of object. Thus
while the Monist Realist must accept that we can quantify over all objects; she need
not accept absolute generality with respect to levels of α-plural reference.
Further, it is plausible that we should not be able to quantify over all instances of
α-plural reference. α-plural reference is articulation of structure. If we are analysing
a statement about α-plural reference, a natural question to ask is the following: “At
18Though obviously a single object may be what constitutes the objects involved in a case of
α-plural reference.
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what level of structure is the statement operating?”. To take a simple example,




Now are (a) and (b) ‘the same’? This question seems to be ambiguous. This is
because from a 1-plural perspective they are the same; they comprise the same objects.
However on a 2-plural level they are different; the arrangement of the objects in (b)
is different from the one in (a).
Thus we see that for any question about α-plural reference it is legitimate to ask at
what level it is directed. The earlier Cantorian argument is directed at no particular
level of α-plural quantification. It is thus not a well formed argument.
Thus we see how α-plural reference allows the plural theorist to hold onto Monist
Realism, whilst being able to deny a certain kind of absolute generality. Thus they
do not have similar puzzles to the one outlined in Chapter 1 to answer, they have
principled reasons to argue that it is not possible to quantify over all α-plural levels.
One might, however, feel a Go¨delian objection that the statement “It is not pos-
sible to quantify over ALL levels of α-plural reference.” is self-undermining. For, in
order to make that statement I must violate it. It is indeed impossible to precisely
state the position that it is not possible to quantify over all levels of α-plural reference.
However, the above example shows that the standpoint is indeed correct, even if not
stateable.
However, this worry about how to state the position about quantification over
levels of α-plural reference might push us to consider alternative ways to reject the
Cantorian argument. Indeed, I think there is another response available.
The Cantorian argument rests on the use of the term ‘everything’. This is most
naturally understood as employing the condition ‘x is a thing’ where ‘thing’ ranges
over objects, kinds of α-plural reference etc. We must then consider all ‘things’. But
we must remember, the ‘paradox’ will only have force if ‘x is a thing’ is definite. That
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was why the puzzle of Chapter 1 was so forceful, we had conditions that had definite
satisfiers. Is the condition ‘x is a thing’ definite?
I think there is reason to suppose that it is not. For the meaning of ‘thing’ cannot
be ‘object’. α-plural reference is not an object, it is merely some things organised a
certain way. As I have argued, there is not always an object that corresponds to a
case of α-plural reference. In what sense then is a case of α-plural reference a ‘thing’?
The term ‘thing’ seems to have no clear meaning, and thus the claim that ‘x is a
thing’ is a definite condition may be resisted.
4.3 Conclusions.
The Plural Account represents a satisfactory characterisation of proper classes for
the Monist Realist. Though it has received a forceful attack from Linnebo using
[COLLAPSE], the nature of proper classes on the Plural Account allows the plural
theorist to appeal to [OHH] and reject [COLLAPSE].
A consideration of superplural reference motivates the acceptance of α-plural ref-
erence for any ordinal α. The interpretation of this phenomenon as ever deeper
articulation of structure on some things allows the plural theorist to reject the claims
that she either separates our notion of collection into infinitely many notions or that
it is possible to generate a puzzle by quantifying over all α-plural levels of reference.
Thus the Monist Realist has a satisfactory account proper classes on the Iterative





A combination of Iterative Conception of Set and Monist Realism present us with a
puzzle. There are conditions φ such that it is definite for any object x whether or not
φ(x) but no set of all φ appears in the Cumulative Hierarchy.
Studying the view that proper classes are objects distinct from their elements
reveals a problem; what is the difference between sets and proper classes? It was
then seen that [OHH] is the best explanation for why proper classes are not sets.
However, the use of [OHH] alongside the Heavyweight View resulted in a proliferation
of different cumulative structures. This, it was argued, is unsatisfactory.
Explaining proper classes in terms of modal resources proved to be fruitless. The
first view examined explained proper classes in terms of functions from possible uni-
verses of Set Theory to subclasses of the domains of those universes. The functions
appealed to by this view were shown to be in themselves paradoxical. A different
explanation of proper classes in virtue of the non-rigidity of their defining conditions
was also shown to be unsatisfactory. There it was seen that the Monist Realist cannot
appeal to any mathematical modality.
A promising solution is to deny the existence of proper classes but to account for
our talk of proper classes through using the resources of plural reference. This view
was seen to respond well to Linnebo’s criticism that there is a collapse of pluralities to
sets, for the reason that (as proper classes are not precise objects) the plural theorist
is able to appeal to [OHH]. Further examination of the view in relation to superplural
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reference lead to the plural theorist being pushed to α-plural quantification for any
ordinal α. A Cantorian puzzle was then presented for this view. However, it was
shown that the puzzle could be resisted, either by denying that it is possible to
quantify over all levels of α-plural reference, or by rejecting the condition ‘x is a
thing’ as definite.
I conclude that if one accepts Monist Realism and the Iterative Conception of
Set then one should deny the existence of proper classes, but account for our talk of
proper classes through plural reference.
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